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REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION: PROPERTY, PROMOTION,
AND THE NEED FOR PROTECTION
CURTIS J. BERGERt
READERS of the June 29, 1958, edition of the Mew York Times may have
puzzled over a sixteen page advertising supplement urging them to buy units
in a syndicate that would soon acquire the leasehold on one of Manhattan's
prominent office buildings.' For many, this was their first glimpse of syndica-
tion-a technique that has become the vogue in real estate investment.2 Syn-
tInstructor in Law, Yale Law School 1959-1960.
The author is indebted for assistance in research on a portion of this Article to Mr.
Donald P. Horwitz, a third-year student at the Yale Law School.
1. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1958, § 10. The promoters of Motors Building Realty Com-
pany sought to raise $5,780,000 to acquire the leasehold of the General Motors Building.
2. Towards the end of WVorld War II, several forces ended the doldrums which had
characterized real estate investment throughout the 1930's and early 1940's. Individual sav-
ings accumulated during the war sought investment outlets. U.S. BunRAu oF THE CEN-
sus, DEP'T OF ComimRce, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrED STATES 436, 457 (1956).
Lending institutions were ready to disgorge, often at bargain basement values, their de-
pression-acquired foreclosed realty holdings. Mfunicipally-owned land, the product of de-
pression tax foreclosures, became attractively available to developers.
The governmental stimulus of insured or guaranteed mortgages, National Housing
Act, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1958); Servicemen's Readjust-
ment Act of 1944, reenacted in amended form, 72 Stat. 1203, 38 U.S.C. § 1801 (1958),
secondary market supports (Federal National Mortgage Association), 48 Stat. 1254 (1934),
as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1717-23 (1958), low interest rates, see, e.g., Chandler, Federal
Reserve Policy and the Federal Debt, 39 AM. EcoN. REv. 405 (1949), and easy-credit lend-
ing policies, see, e.g., P-H FED. AIDS TO FINANCING 1f 18028 (no-down-payment mortgages
were available to ex-G.I. homebuyers), helped finance a construction upsurge, see U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENsus, DEP'T OF CoMMERCEc op. cit. supra at 757.
Higher rentals, see id. at 324, generally improving business conditions, and inflation-in-
creased real estate values, see id. at 315, partially restored public confidence and whetted
investment appetite.
The real estate syndicate emerged in the early 1950's to help transform interest into
action. Real estate syndication had its roots in the Metropolitan New York area. Currently
the syndicators are extending their operations beyond New York as measured by the situs
of acquired properties and the residence of promoters and investors. See Sherman, Sy.di-
cating h;m the Baltihmre Area, in NATIONAL INsTITUTE OF REAL EsTATE Bnonms, RE.tL
ESTATE SYvDIcATas 42 (1957) ; Morris, Florida Syndicates, id. at 48; Wilbur, How They
Do It it Chicago, id. at 52. See also Letter From Justin Hinders, Exec. Vice-Pres., Wash-
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dication-the pooling of the resources of a group of individual investors to ac-
ington (D.C.) Real Estate Board, Inc., to Curtis J. Berger, Nov. 19, 1959, on file in Yale
Law Library.
Syndicate ventures own (1) office buildings, e.g., Graybar Building Assodates, Pro-
spectus, March 10, 1958; (2) apartment houses, see Stern, Apartments Lure Many Syndi-
cates, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1957, § 8, p. 1, col. 7, at 6, cols. 1-3 (suggests that apartments
may have unique advantages for syndicate investment) ; Investors Seek Role it; Housing,
N.Y. Times, July 26, 1959, § 8, p. 1, col. 2; e.g., Texmar Realty Co., Certificate of Limited
Partnership, filed N.Y. County Clerk's Office, Aug. 27, 1959 (apartments in Silver Spring,
Md., and Dallas, Tex.) ; (3) hotels, see, e.g., Drake Associates, Certificate of Limited Part-
nership, filed N.Y. County Clerk's Office, Aug. 19, 1959 (Hotel Drake, N.Y.C.) ; (4) motels,
see, e.g., Phoenix Motel Co., Certificate of Limited Partnership, filed N.Y. County Clerk's
Office, April 22, 1959 (The Caravan Motel, Phoenix, Ariz.) ; (5) theatres, see, e.g., Na-
tional Munsey Co., Prospectus, Nov. 20, 1959 (Munsey Bldg. & National Theatre, Wash-
ington, D.C.) ; (6) bowling alleys, see Combined Bowling Co., Certificate of Limited Part-
nership, filed N.Y. County Clerk's Office, Sept. 10, 1959; (7) shopping centers, see Glen
Oaks Shopping Center Realty Co., Certificate of Limited Partnership, filed N.Y. County
Clerk's Office, May 27, 1959.
In addition, syndicates are being formed for the development of real estate improve-
ments. See Greenblatt, The Why and How of Real Estate Syndications: Syndicatiott Illus-
trated, Prac. Law., March 1959, p. 65, at 68; Falcaro Associates, Offering Circular, 1959
(syndicate to construct and own 40 lane bowling establishment) ; Realty, Dec. 22, 1959, p.
31, col. 3 (parking garage); N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1958, p. 35, col. 6 (urban renewal pro-
ject). The tightness of the institutional money market has been one factor leading to greater
syndicate participation in construction. See N.Y. Hearings on Real Estate Syndication Be-
fore Hon. George Frankenthaler, Nov. 18, 1957, p. 2a, on file in New York City office of
attorney general of New York State.
The author examined all notices of copartnership published in the New York Law Jour-
nal for limited partnerships that had filed certificates in the New York County (Manhat-
tan) Clerk's Office during 1958 and 1959. Where it appeared that the partnership was
acquiring an interest in real property, and not less -than ten limited partners would invest
in the venture, -the formation of a real estate syndicate was inferred. Admittedly, the choice
of ten or more investors is arbitrary. I resolved any uncertainties, as to the partnership
purpose or the number of investors, against a real estate syndicate's existence.
Since the limited partnership is the most widely used, but not the only syndicate form,
see notes 10-14 infra and accompanying text, the following figures reflect the minimum vol-
ume of syndicate activity.
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quire or develop an agreed-upon real asset-presently covers property worth
upwards of three billion dollars,3 and further increases at the annual rate of at
least one billion dollars are expected. 4 Although a syndicate may consist of a
handful of wealthy investors, well-known to one another, and each personally
concerned with the operation of the enterprise, the major focus of this Article
will be directed towards the widely held venture, whose participants are de-
pendent upon the integrity, judgment, and ability of a syndicate manager for
their investment rewards. Often the investor is getting his first taste of real
estate investment, and brings to the venture the hopes, fears, and confusion of
the dabbler. By contrast, the syndicator usually has "been around"; he has
lived in a world where "balloon," "prime tenant," and "leaseback" are terms
of everyday speech.
Protection of the amateur investor against the risks that may defeat his ex-
pectations has been a long-standing aim of governmental regulation. Before
examining what state and federal authorities have done to protect the syn-
dicate investor, this Article will examine the risks of real estate investment,
both in general and with particular reference to syndication. But first, how
does syndication work, who are the investors, and why are they drawn to this
form of investment?
SYNDICATION: ITS MECHANICS, ITS -CUSTOMERS, AND ITS APPEAL
Before a syndicate is formed, the promoters customarily select the property
which the venture will own. A complex of variables may affect this choice.5
3. Interview With Louis J. Glicknan, N.Y. Realtor, in New York City, Nov. 27,
1959; see Remarks of Albert Mintzer, Founder of SIRE Plan, Inc., Before Overseas
Press Club, as reported in Real Estate Forum, Nov. 1958, p. 11 (estimate of $9 billion).
See also The National Real Estate Investor, March 1960, p. 2 ("dollar volume of syn-
dication will increase 60 percent in 1960").
4. See ibid.
For a general prophesy of syndication's future, see Statement of Louis J. Glickman,
Realty, Jan. 19, 1960, p. 3, col. 3 ("1960 will ... begin ... an unprecedented growth").
This sentiment recalls a similar spirit of the late 1920's:
Syndicate ownership-
Not so many years ago the term "syndicate!' frightened the ordinary man. It
sounded like "high finance" and he would have none of it. He is now becoming in-
terested and its advantages are resulting in its use to a considerable ex\tent. It is ex-
tremely desirable as a method for operating or speculating in real estate. It enables
numerous persons each to take a small share in a project with the result that, should
there be a loss, the loss is distributed among the group without resulting in serious
financial embarrassment to any one member....
NoRTH, VAN BuEx & SmITr, REAL ESTATIE FINANcING 165-66 (1928).
5. Statement of Marvin Kratter, New York Realtor, to Students at Yale Law School.
Nov. 12, 1953. Syndicate promoters are generous donors of "How I Do It" advice. See, e.g.,
Stem, Syndicated Investimets, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1956, § 8, p. 1, cols. 6-7; Wien, Haw
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The parcel is inspected with an eye -to its competitive location, physical con-
dition and the likelihood of future repairs and capital improvements. Account-
ants or attorneys pore over past operating records, rent schedules and leases,
and explore available financing in order to project the property's income and
expense potential. The key figure in this projection is the "bottom line"-
cash yield after federal incomes taxes. The bottom line is the axis about which
negotiations for the parcel will necessarily revolve. Assuming a favorable
evaluation, the syndicate manager will then attempt to acquire the property
at a price, and upon terms, that will sustain a cash flow to investors at a
decided-upon minimum rate.
Should the negotiations culminate in a contract to buy, the promoter will
customarily make a deposit-as much as ten per cent of the ultimate purchase
price-forfeitable if he does not perform.6 This deposit, or option payment,
together with expenses of overhead, property acquisition, and promotion, often
constitutes a sizeable investment which the promoter hopes to recover when
he organizes his syndicate ;7 the promoter usually retains only a nominal cash
investment in the completed transaction although his "paper" interests may
the Syndicate Functions, 14 REcomD N.Y.C.B.A. 51 (1959) ; Greenblatt, Real Estate Syn-
dication: Some Basic Considerations, 14 REcoRD N.Y.C.B.A. 65 (1959) ; Lifton, How To
Organize a S, ccessful Syndication, The National Real Estate Investor, 'March 1960, p.
10. For a detailed outline of the factors an investor should consider when buying a build-
ing, see Courtney, Tips From a Pro, The National Real Estate Investor, March 1960,
pp. 18-19.
6. The following are representative of cash deposits made by promoters under pur-
chase contracts for property which they subsequently syndicated.
Cash Required by
Purchase Contract Cash Deposit
The Teagen Company $580,000 $20,000
Prospectus, Aug. 24, 1959, p. 3
Garment Capitol Associates $18,762,750 $1,000,000
Prospectus, Feb. 13, 1957, p. 7
Brocol Realty Company $783,500 $50,000
Brochure, April 1959, p. 8
Graybar Building Associates $4,000,000 $400,000
Prospectus, March 10, 1958, p. 6
7. One corporate syndicator estimated its expenses in connection with the syndication
of an office building in mid-Manhattan at $135,000, plus a $50,000 deposit on the purchase
contract. Expenses included fees for legal and accounting services, tax consultation, title
insurance, surveys, appraisal and depreciation reports, printing and stenography, advertis-
ing and legal publication, and filing and recording. The promoter intended to recover these
outlays from the proceeds of a $1,335,000 public offering. See Brocol Realty Co., Brochure,
April 1959, p. 8.
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be quite substantial.8 Thug, once the participation shares are successfully
marketed, the investors bear almost all risk of loss of invested capital.
A variety of forms are available to the syndicate entity. The factors dictating
a choice are complex and many are beyond the scope of this Article." Currently
the limited partnership, in which the promoter and his associates are the gen-




Amount of Offering Stated in
Name of Offering (Dollars) Prospectus
Graybar Building Associates 4,180,000 20,000
501 Fifth Realty Company 2,145,000 50,000
Lord Elgin Hotel :Company 1,655,000 30,00
Brocol Realty Company 1,325,000 50,00
See also N.Y. Hearings on Real Estate Syndicat ion Before Hon. Gcorge Franh:enthaker,
Nov. 6, 1957, p. 62, on file in New York City office of New York attorney general.
9. See Aronsohn, Syndicates, N.Y.U. 16TH INsT. ox FF.o. T.x. 637 (1958); Pennish,
The Story of Real Estate Syndication, Tax Counselor's Q., June 1959, p. 111.
Some of the tax factors are examined in the text following note 85 infra.
10. See Brudno, Syndicates and Inconte Taxation, in NATIONAL INSTITLTr OF R&%L
ESTATE BRoxERs, REAL ESTATE SYxDIcATEs AND How THEY AVonx 11, 14 (1957).
In 1959, Marvin Kratter and Robert Futterman left the syndicator ranks when each
formed a corporation bearing his name to hold under one umbrella all of the properties he
had previously syndicated. See The Kratter Corp., Prospectus, April 24, 1959; Elliott.
Appraising the Syndicates, Barron's, June 8, 1959, p. 3, at -0; Realty, Jan. 19, 1960, p. 1,
cols. 3-5. Perhaps significantly, a third promoter, Louis Glickman, also tried to cunvert his
separate syndicate ventures into a unitary corporation. See The Glickman Corp., Preliminmar
Prospectus, May 6, 1959. Glickman abandoned the plan when many of his syndicate inves-
tors would not accept the conversion. Elliott, stpra at 3.
The switchover to a real estate operating corporation by two of the most active syndi-
cators (total estimated holdings of Kratter ventures $50,000,000, see Elliott, supra at 3.)
may spur imitation; and produce significant changes in the present pattern of public real
estate investment
Whereas the syndicate investor usually depends upon a single property for his invest-
ment rewards, the shareholder in a corporation owning many properties "enjoys" risk-
spreading. Kratter has described this diversification as of major benefit for its investors.
See The Kratter Corp., Release, July 22, 1959. But since the level of overall risk is between
that of the least risky and the most risky ventures, some syndicate investors may have
actually increased their risk by giving up an interest in a single property. And at least the
syndicate investor knows what he owns. The certificates of a corporate shareholder may
represent a fractional interest- in the Empire State Building on Monday and in a million
beer barrels on Tuesday.
A more impressive argument for public corporate investment is the liquidity of the in-
vestment unit. See text at notes 55-65 infra for a discussion of the liquidity of syndicate
interests. For example, shares of The Kratter Corporation were listed recently on the
American Stock Exchange, see N.Y. Times, March 23, 1960, p. 52, col 3, and they may
be hypothecated at some lending institutions, Address of Marvin Kratter to Yale Law
Students, Jan. 13, 1960.
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corporation," general partnership, 12 tenancy-in-common, 3 and various hybrid
forms.'
4
In marketing the investment interests, promoters may rely on sales person-
nel, independent brokers, or public advertising, as well as mail and direct per-
sonal appeals -to previous syndicate investors, clients, and friends. 15 As the in-
11. SIRE Post Office -Plan, Inc., Amended Offering Circular, Sept. 15, 1959 (invest-
ment units, each consisting of one $50 ten-year, 6% debenture and one $50 share of the $3.50
cumulative participating preferred stock) ; Forest Hills Biscayne Gramercy Corp., Prospec-
tus [undated] ($5,000 investment units, each consisting of one $3,960 corporate note and
208 shares of the $5 par value preferred stock).
12. See, e.g., Warwick Hotel Associates, Prospectus, July 13, 1955 (hotel) ; Garment
Capitol Associates, Prospectus, Feb. 13, 1957 (office building) ; Leader-Cleveland Realty
Associates, Prospectus, Aug. 5, 1958 (office building) ; Leone 48th St. Associates, Prospec-
tus, Aug. 14, 1959 (restaurant).
Lawrence Wien, Esq., New York Attorney, who promoted these syndications, prefers
the general partnership form largely because he feels it is less likely to be treated as a
"taxable association" than is a limited partnership. Interview With Henry W. Klein, Esq.,
Law Partner of Mr. Wien, in New York City, Sept. 22, 1959.
13. See, e.g., Institute for Business Planning, Real Estate Investment Letter, May 6,
1959, p. 67 (Fairfax Building, Kansas City, Mo.).
In the Fairfax Building syndication:
(1) The promoters held title to the real estate as trustees for the benefit of the in-
vestors. The trustees were also to engage in supervisory management, which they
characterized as "ministerial."
(2) 60% consent of the investor coowners was necessary for the sale, transfer, or
refinancing of the property.
(3) Neither the death of an investor nor the transfer of his interest would interrupt
the entity.
Whether this arrangement will skirt the "taxable association" crevice is doubtful. In
addition to continuity, the venture may also be deemed to have centralized management
despite the promoters' description of their supervisory duties as "ministerial." See notes
118-28 infra and accompanying text.
For earlier examples of coownership by the syndicate investors, see The Levittown
Shopping Center, Unit One, Offering Circular, Aug. 13, 1956; manqueens SIRE Plan, Inc.,
Offering Circular, June 14, 1956.
For a brief summary of the possible disadvantages of coownership in the syndicate ven-
ture, see Asch, Tax Considerations in Real Estate Syndicatlion, 3 ViL. L. Rav. 469, 483
(1958).
14. For an example of a syndication combining the sale of interests in a corporation
and limited partnership, see Falcaro Associates & Falcaro's East Islip Lanes, Inc., Bro-
chure [undated] (investors offered package deal containing a $2,000 unit in 'Associates
[limited partnership] and $1,000 debenture bond in the corporation; Associates to construct
a forty-lane -bowling alley for operation by corporation under long-term lease).
15. Interview With J. M. Tenney, New York Syndicator, in New York City, Nov. 27,
1959; Interview With Henry Klein, Esq., New York Attorney, in New York City, Sept.
22, 1959.
With each new venture, established promoters are likely to mail a prospectus to investors
in earlier syndications. If there are several ground-floor associates, each may have his per-
sonal following of family, friends, clients and coinvestors.
To enhance or supplement the response of a mail or direct appeal, syndicator Jerry M.
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vestment units are sold, the purchasers execute a subscription agreement and
such other documents as are required by the form of the syndicate adopted.
The syndicate becomes viable if sufficient funds are raised, via subscription and
perhaps supplemented by the promoter's own resources, to acquire the prop-
erty. If not, stbscription payments are either returned 'a or, by agreement,
transferred to another venture 17
The promoter has many sources of profit in a typical syndication. He may
receive a brokerage fee from the seller of the property ;18 a profit on the trans-
fer of the property or assignment of the executory sales contract to the syn-
dicate ;19 and promotional underwriting discounts and commissions.2 0 Should
Tenney described his reliance on staff salesmen, independent brokers, word-of-mouth, and
public relations. Tenney's operational pattern seems fairly typical.
Tenney's staff includes several full-time salesmen who follow up a mail solicitation by
meeting intending investors and discussing with them the particulars of the proposed ven-
ture. Presumably, as salesmen, Tenney's sales personnel are expected to sell.
Tenney has also used several of the approximately twenty-five New York City broker-
dealers who specialize in syndicate offerings, and who are registered with the SEC (Securi-
ties Exchange Act § 15) and the State of New York (N.Y. Gmz. Bus. L,-w § 359e). The
independent dealer may underwrite a portion of the offering on a "best efforts" basis; he
will then try to place his shares through newspaper advertisements or personal contact.
Publicity has for its goal the creation of a favorable public image--that of a successful
syndicator. Tenney tries to link his name with syndication in newspaper articles. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1958, § 8 (Real Estate), p. 1, col. 4; id., July 22, 1958, § 8, p. 1, col. 3,
and in trade journals directed to brokers, lawyers, and accountants, see, e.g., The National
Real Estate Investor, Sept. 1959, p. 1.
16. See Queenstown Gardens, Revised Prospectus, Oct. 28, 1959, p. 2; Dyckman Hotel
Associates, Prospectus, Jan. 27, 1959, p. 4; The Teagen Co., Prospectus, Aug. 24, 1959, p. 4.
Occasionally, a promoter agrees to pay interest upon subscription funds from their re-
ceipt until they are either invested or returned. See, e.g., 501 Fifth Realty Co., Prospectus,
Nov. 12, 1959, pp. 6, 16.
17. For an example, see SIRE Post Office Plan, Inc., Amended Offering Circular,
Sept. 15, 1959, p. 7. In order to switch the moneys raised to another venture, the promoter
was to send an amended prospectus to the subscriber. The latter could get his money back,
if he acted within fifteen days. But in doing so, he would lose part of the interest that his
subscription had already earned while it was in the promoter's hands. A combination of
human inertia and an unwillingness to suffer the drop in interest income might soften the
turn-down rate for the substitute venture.
18 In the syndication of the Levittown Shopping Center, Unit One, one of the pro-
moter's affiliates, Realdeals, Inc., acted as a cooperating broker in negotiating the sale of
the property to a second promoter affiliate, The Small Investors Real Estate Plan, Inc. Real-
deals, Inc. received one-third of the '0,000 brokerage paid by the seller. See SIRE Plan,
Levittown Shopping Center, Offering Circular, Aug. 13, 1956, p. 13. The second affiliate
then received a $15,000 profit for an assignraent of its contractual rights to the syndicate
investors. Id. at 15.
19. These profits are often substantial, see, e.g., the prospectuses for the following syn-
dicates: 'Madison-54th Realty Co. [undated], p. 1 ($100,000) ; Glen Oaks Shopping Center
Realty Co., May 26, 1959, p. 1 ($200,000) ; 501 Fifth Realty Co., Nov. 12, 1959, p. 6 ($375,-
000), and may take the form of cost-free participation units, see Glen Oaks Shopping Center
Realty Co., Brochure, supra.
20. SIRE Plan Portfolios, Inc. is the underwiter affiliate of The SIRE Plan, Inc. In
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he be an attorney, his office may receive legal fees for handling the transaction,
as well as an annual retainer.21 Promoters generally share in the property's
revenues, either as the operating tenant or as the owner of a participating in-
terest in the syndicate. Realtor promoters may undertake management of the
property, thereby earning a management fee.2 2 Finally, the promoter usually
reserves the right to a disproportionate share of any gains from a resale or
refinancing of syndicate property.23
Some syndicators direct their appeal to the small investor. In a recent
a typical SIRE Plan promotion, SIRE Post Office Plan, Inc., offered $280,000 in its deben-
tures and preferred stock, to finance the purchase of a three-story post-office building. The
issuer contracted with SIRE Plan Portfolios, Inc., for a best-efforts promotion of its offer-
ing, the underwriter affiliate to receive a 15% commission for its services. In addition, the
underwriter bargained for an additional $22,500 as reimbursement for underwriting ex-
penses, broadly defined to include 7% per annum interest to subscribers during the offering
period, printing, mailing, title insurance, legal, accounting, and property acquisition costs.
Any moneys not expended were deemed additional compensation to the underwriter. Thus,
of the $280,000 offering proceeds, SIRE Plan Portfolios, Inc., would siphon off $64,500
(23.3%). SIRE Post Office Plan, Inc., Amended Offering Circular, Sept. 15, 1959, p. 7.
21. The following is a list of legal fees paid to one syndicators' law firm.
Paid From Proceeds Annual*
of Offering Retainer
Leone 48th St. Associates $115,000 $ 9,000
Hotel Taft Associates 
-0-- $90,000
Dyckman Hotel Associates $133,500 $ 9,000 (until 1967)
$17,750 (until 1973)
$27,000 (1973 & after)
Warwick Hotel Associates $218,000 $21,000
Leader-Cleveland Realty Associates $123,000 $14,000
Garment Capitol Associates $520,000 $40,000
*The annual retainer covers supervision of the partnership agreement and all regular
accounting costs and disbursements.
22. See, e.g., SIRE Post Office Plan, Inc., Amended Offering Circular, Sept. 15, 1959,
p. 6 (promoter-affiliate to receive 3% of gross rental); Manqucens SIRE Plan, Inc.,
Offering Circular, June 14, 1956, p. 16 (promoter-affiliate to receive 5% of rentals)
Forest Hills Biscayne Gramercy Corp., Brochure [undated], p. 10.
Promoters may also receive a large per cent of the rental income of the syndicate prop-
erty above a specified amount. See, e.g., The Levittown SIRE Plan, Prospectus, Aug. 13,
1956, p. 14 (surplus over stated rental payments divided equally between the promoter-
affiliate and investors) ; Forest Hills 'Biscayne Gramercy Corp., Prospectus [undated], ,p. 6
(promoter-affiliate makes fixed rental payment to investor, receives all rental income in-
creases to stated amount, 75% of excess above stated amount) ; Stanbalt Realty Co,, Bro-
chure, Dec. 16, 1957, p. 6 (promoter-affiliated lessee makes fixed rental payment to inves-
tors; as additional rental, investors receive one-half of lessee's "net earnings (before depre-
ciation and income taxes) from operation of property in excess of $100,000 per year").
23. See, for example, the following provision contained in Thirty Four Associates,
Articles of Limited Partnership, Aug. 1, 1957, p. 3:
9(a) The funds described in paragraph 8, shall be allocated and distributed to
each of the partners in the ratio that each partner's number of Capital Units owned
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SIRE Plan syndication, for instance, one hundred dollar participations were
sold, and the median investment was 1,068 dollars.24 At the other extreme,
forty-five presumably well-to-do individuals pooled 4,70,000 dollars to acquire
New York City's Hotel Astor, an average investment in excess of 100,000
dollars.25 Most syndicate ventures, however, are far removed from either ex-
treme and involve the sale of five and ten thousand dollar units. An examina-
tion of the limited partnership certificates filed in the New York County Clerk's
Office during 1958 covering real estate syndicate ventures evidenced the fol-
lowing breakdown:
Average No.
Moneys Raised No. of of Investors Average
Via Syndication Syndicates Pcr Syndicate Investment
$50,000 and under 4 14 $ 2,850
$50,001-100,000 11 16 5,100
$100,001-300,000 17 25 7,100
$300,001-500,000 10 57 7,150
$500,001-1,000,000 7 94 7,250
$1,000,001-2,000,000 7 152 101250
over $2,000,000 3 176 19,900
No comprehensive analysis has been made of the average syndicate investor
which attempts to describe his motivation. But tentative conclusions, based
upon interviews with syndicate promoters and examination of the few frag-
mentary statistics now available,2 6 may be offered. At least three factors en-
hance the appeal of syndications in the competition for the investor's dollar.
First is the comparatively attractive investment yield. A typical syndicate par-
ticipant expects a ten to twelve per cent annual return during the venture's
bears to the aggregate total of Capital Units owned by all the partners, except as
provided in subparagraph 9(b) hereof.
9(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph 9(a) above, in the event
that the Partnership sells or otherwise disposes of the property, then, any funds aail-
able for distribution after such sale or other disposition in excess of $4,000,000, as
defined in paragraph 8 shall be distributed as follows: 20% of such excess funds shall
be distributed to... [promoter] and the remaining 80% as provided in subparagraph
9(a) hereof.
24. By September 17, 1958, 246 individuals had invested $262,900 in Preston House
SIRE Plan, Inc. The moneys were used to acquire Preston House, an apartment structure
in Queens, New York. Appropriately, a Texan made the largest single investment, $13,700;
a few others paid $5,000 or more for a participation interest. At least ten investors purchased
only one $100 unit. The Preston House subscribers lived in 81 communities in 25 states.
Seventeen were members of the U.S. Armed Services. SIRE Plan Portfolios, Inc., Report,
Sept. 1958, on file in Yale Law Library.
25. Astor Associates, Certificate of Limited Partnership, filed May 23, 1958, in the N.Y.
County Clerk's Office.
26. The most elaborate survey of syndicate investors known to the author vas made
by the Glickman organization in 1959. Over 3000 individuals who had invested in Glickman-
sponsored syndicates received a three-page questionnaire; about 500 (17%) replied. Inter-
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formative years.2 7 Later on, if the property is refinanced upon -favorable terms,
the yield may increase.28  This reference to yield in describing what the in-
vestor receives, however, is frequently misleading for it disguises the fact that
view With Louis Siegal, Vice-President, Glickman Corp., in New York City, Nov. 27, 1959.
The replies, in part, are reproduced below:
L Do you presently own a unit in one or more real estate syndications?
7 None 70 Three
147 One 51 Four
111 Two 75 More
2. If you do, what is the approximate extent of all your real estate syndication invest-
ments ?
107 $2,500-$ 5,000 109 $15,000-$35,000
165 $5,000-$15,000 66 over $35,000
3. What is your occupation?
Employed Self-Employed
18 Teacher 30 Medicine 70 Retired
60 Executive 9 Law 45 Other
21 Industrial Worker 8 Accountant
27 Office staff 64 Entrepreneur
59 Other 56 Housewife
4. What is your approximate age?
13 Twenties 156 Fifties
63 Thirties 98 Sixties
113 Forties 8 Seventies 13 over Seventy
7. What is your approximate current income group?
7 under $5,000 79 $20,000-$50,000
146 $5,000-$10,000 18 over $50,000
145 $10,000-$20,000
8. Before buying a syndication unit, did you ever invest in real estate other than
ownership of your own home?
96 an income-producing property of your own
72 an income-producing property with partners
23 real estate corporate stock
257 none other
27. See Helmsley, Real Estate Syndications, Analysts J., Feb. 1958, p. 30 (10%-12%) ;
Zukowsky, Syndicate Surge, Wall Street Journal, March 4, 1958, p. 1, col. 6 (7%-15%).
Among the investors responding -to the Glickman questionnaire, see note 26 supra, over 60%
had received 12% per annum or better in syndicate distributions.
Although the typical syndicate range is as indicated, occasional ventures depart rather
sharply from the norm. For example, participants in the syndication of the Desert Inn in
Las Vegas will receive a 1% .per annum return for three years, 20% per annum during the
4th through 20th years, and 25% per annum thereafter. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1959, § 8 (Real
Estate), p. 1, col. 4.
28. For an example of the effect on syndicate yield of mortgage refinancing, see Helms-
ley, Brokering to the Upper Brackets, in NATIONAL INSZrruTE OF REAL ESTATE BROKEiUS,




the return is not entirely "income," but is partially repayment of capital. ' 9
Furthermore, when the income yield is relatively fixed,3 0 as when syndicate
property has been leased on a long-term net-rental basis, the investor bears
the risk of declining dollar values. 31 Even with these qualifications, however,
the yield on a syndicate investment exerts a magnetic attraction when com-
pared -to the return on most stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and savings ac-
counts. 32 In addition, promoters have emphasized that the portion of the yield
which represents a return of capital is not taxable when received, a fact which
appeals to tax-conscious investors.33
A second motive for participation in a syndication is the desire for real estate
ownership. For some, the enduring quality of real estate suggests a stable, con-
servative investment.34 For others, the ownership of a landmark which can be
readily observed or shown off may bring a psychic satisfaction, even when
one's interest is fractionally small. Syndication is a means of satisfying these
desires for persons financially unable to acquire full ownership of an equity or
unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities of property management. In addition,
the wealthier investor, by acquiring interests in several syndicates, may diver-
sify his real-estate portfolio, geogaphically, functionally, by growth potential,
or by degree of risk.35
Finally, the syndicate investor is attracted by the prospects of capital growth.
In part, this expectation reflects the historic, long-term increment in land
values, 36 and the belief that future inflationary pressures will generate further
29. See text at notes 95-97 infra.
30. Typically, when the syndicate does not retain its operating position, see text at note
66 infra, the investor's return is fixed until the property's income exceeds a stated figure
which is considerably greater than its current income, see, e.g., Brocol Realty Co., Brochure,
April 1959, p. 5; 501 Fifth Realty Co., Brochure, Nov. 12, 1959, p. 12.
31. See Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of America, Quarterly Economic Report of Trends
in the Mortgage Industry, Jan. 27, 1960. This source indicates that a dollar invested in 1940
was worth 48 cents in 1959. Thus a fixed dollar obligation in 1940, which matured in 1960,
would have had to bear interest at 3.9% compounded yearly to preserve an investor's capital
without any investment return.
32. Alternative investments currently offer the following yields: 125 Industrial Com-
mon Stocks-3.26%; 10 High Grade Industrial Preferred Stocks-4.62%; Aaa Industrial
Bonds-4.49%. 1960 MooDys INDUSTMUA 1729.
33. See text at notes 95-97 infra.
34. Nearly 50% of the Glickman respondents (216) professed faith in the stability of
real estate investment. See note 26 supra.
35. Marvin Kratter made the argument for diversification in November 1958 when
speaking as a syndicator to a forum of Yale Law School students. Mr. Kratter pointed out
that an investor who spread $100,000 among twenty syndicate ventures derived a "mutual
fund" benefit when compared with $100,000 invested in a single property. One year later,
speaking in the same forum, but as the spirit of The Kratter Corporation-a multiproperty
owner, Kratter asserted that one of his stockholders (at $17 per share, bid price) had gained
the benefit of diversification he could not achieve with a $5,000 syndicate investment. See
note 10 supra. Thus, syndication may effect diversification for the well-to-do, the public real
estate corporation diversification for the more modest investor.
36. Land values in the United States have increased nearly 800% since 1900. U.S.
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price gains. 7 Equity growth may also result from the retirement of the mort-
gage financing with which most syndicated real property improvements are
encumbered. As the debt principal recedes, the investors' equity enlarges, pro-
vided that real depreciation does not exceed the rate of debt amortization. 8
THE PITFALLS OF REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT
In General
Oversupply and Underoccupancy. Economic prosperity is usually evidenced
by an upsurge in construction of real estate improvements. 0 The lure of con-
struction and operating profits may generate speculative activity among estab-
lished builders, and attract new entrepreneurs into an industry where entry is
relatively easy. 40 Some evidence exists that this pattern of speculation, as in the
twenties,41 is creating a supply of land improvements which our economy can-
not absorb. For example, the post-World War II office building 'boom in Man-
hattan will have produced 'by the end of 1961 over forty-five million square
feet of new office space.42 Despite a steady rise in vacancies,43 the increased
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMaERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcT OF THE UNITED
STATES 324 (1959).
37. See Grebler, The Task Ahead in Real Estate Research, The Mortgage Banker,
Dec. 1959, p. 16, at 18-19.
For an example of a promoter's use of the argument that real estate is an anti-inflation
hedge, see The Levittown Shopping Center, Unit One, Offering Circular, Aug. 13, 1956,
p. 12. For a more cautious view, see Fogarty, Is Real Estate an Inflation Hedger, Architec-
tural F., June 1959, p. 155.
38. See, e.g., The Levittown Shopping Center, Unit One, Offering Circular, Aug. 13,
1956, p. 7.
39. See generally SHULTZ & SIMMONS, OFFICEs IN THE SKY 153-63 (1959). For a
description of an apparent cyclical pattern in real estate activity, see RA TcLIn, U"AN LAND
ECONoMJcs 338-41. (1949).
40. See Kaplan, Profile of the Contract Construction Industry, Construction Rev., Feb.
1957, pp. 4-5, 7-8.
41. Manhattan's office space increased 92% between 1925-1931. The next two years
added another 56%, including the Empire State Building and Rockefeller Center. See
SHULTZ & SIMMONS, OFFIcEs IN THE SKY 154 (1959).
42. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1960, § 8, p. 4, cols. 2-7.
43. See id., July 1, 1958, p. 53, col. 5; id., May 8, 1959, p. 44, col. 3, But see id., June
20, 1959, p. 32, col. 4 (new buildings will not increase vacancies).
In the year ending April 30, 1958, one million square feet of additional office building
quarters became vacant in 387 structures in New York City. During this period, plans were
filed for 19 new buildings, having a total capacity of seven million square feet.
Vacancy Rate
June 1, 1959 June 1, 1958 June 1, 1957
Office Bldg. 2.5% 2.5% 1.3%
Loft Bldg. 3.0% 2.8% 1.7%
Figures supplied by Dr. Gordon MacDonald, Director of Research, Real Estate Board of
New York, Inc.
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bargaining power of prime tenants,H and the expressed concern of informed
observers,45 an additional twenty-five office buildings are already projected for
completion beginning in 1962.40 And, because the completion of newly con-
structed major buildings ordinarily lags behind the planning stage by several
years, a sharp do-wnward shift in demand during the construction period will
either have no effect on the completion of the building, thus aggravating the
existing oversupply, or lead to a frequently more costly alternative, abandon-
ment of the project.
Obsolescence. Combined with, and perhaps a partial cause of, oversupply is
the rapid technological advance that has transformed the face and interior of
the American building within a generation. Air conditioning, high-speed self-
service elevators, fluorescent lighting, automatic heating systems, innovations
in structural materials and designs, and rapidly changing concepts of interior
decoration are hastening the obsolescence of existing improvements. 7 The first
pinch of an oversupply is felt by the older facilities, whose owners must either
modernize or expect a lowering of tenant quality and a relative drop in rental
income.48 Moreover, modernization is often very costly. 49
Undesirable Location. The immobility of real estate highlights the importance
of suitable location. Population trends, availability of parking, access to pri-
vate and public transportation, physical condition of the surrounding neigh-
borhood, changes in the traveling and shopping habits of the consuming pub-
lic, a shifting of the center of business or industrial activity, the proximity and
quality of competition, the impact of urban renewal programs, directly affect
44. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1958, § 8, p. 1, col. 2 ("leasing situation has switched from
seller's to buyer's market").
45. See statement of S. Earle Honig, New York City realtor of thirty-years experi-
ence, in Barron's, May 16, 1955, p. 20; N.Y. Times, June 24, 1958, p. 52, col. 1.
During an era of tight supply, 1946-1958, when .racancy rate was less than 3%, rental
increases matched rising operating costs. If supply loosens, building owners will face gather-
ing tenant resistance to further rental increases, despite steady rise in real property taxes,
interest rates, labor expenses, etc.
46. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1960, § 8, p. 4, cols. 2-7 (table). The accompanying article,
id. § 8, at 1, col. 1, sets a hopeful tone over rental prospects for new Manhattan office build-
ings, especially when compared with the alarms voiced in 195S against the backdrop of re-
cession.
47. See -Architectural F., Jan. 1960, p. 115.
48. See Realty, Dec. 22, 1959, p. 37, col. 1 ("Modernization now a necessity to keep
prime tenants") ; N.Y. Hearings on Real Estate Syndication Before Hon. George Franlhen-
thaler, Nov. 6, 1957, p. 70.
49. See Stanbalt Realty Co., Prospectus, Dec. 16, 1957, p. 4 (installation of central air-
conditioning system in the fifteen-story Standard Oil Building, Baltimore, Md., cost V50,-
000). Architectural F., Jan. 1960, p. 117, describes the modernization program launched by
Louis Glickiman on the former National Biscuit Co. buildings in midtovn Manhattan. Glick-
man paid $5 million for the property, and then spent nearly $4 million in improvements, in-
cluding elevators, heating, plumbing, sprinkler system, electrical service, and tenant area
alterations. Glickman organized a syndicate in June 1959 to raise $4A million from public
investors to own and operate the property. See Industry City Realty Co., Certificate of
Limited Partnership, filed N.Y. County Clerk's Office, June 5, 1959.
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the investment quality of real property. Adverse developments, as well as
beneficial ones, may occur with comparative suddenness. For example, the
recently fashionable apartment -houses on Manhattan's upper West Side are
being surrounded by a rapidly deteriorating blighted area 0 while Third Ave-
nue, for years the domain of pawn shops and grog shops, is now a highly
desirable commercial and residential artery.
5
'
Management. The profitable ownership of investment-type real estate is large-
ly dependent upon management skill.52 The ability to curb expenditures with-
out curtailing services, the knack of obtaining tenants and negotiating desir-
able leases, the adroit handling of complex ,human relationships-landlord-
tenant, employer-employee, taxpayer-municipal authority-and sound judg-
ment whether to make or defer capital improvements is a partial catalog of
needed managerial skills. Even an investment in prime real estate becomes
risky without able management. Furthermore, once a property 'has 'been tar-
nished by poor management, the stigma may linger in the view of prospective
tenants long after a satisfactory change has been effected.
Financing. Most of the improved nonresidential real estate in the United
States is encumbered by mortgage debt.53 Because debt service is often a major
expense item,5 4 the attractiveness of property for the prospective investor may
hinge upon its financing structure. Factors relevant to any analysis include
interest and amortization rate, maturity of the debt, identity of the lender,
extent of personal liability, restrictions on the operation of the premises in-
corporated in the mortgage indenture, absence or presence of secondary financ-
ing, and privileges of prepayment. In addition, the likelihood of obtaining debt
refinancing can be of major import; if the existing debt is not self-liquidating,
it may not 'be replaceable, either in amount or in terms, at or 'before maturity.
Risks Peculiar to Syndication
Nonliquidity of the Investment Interest. The liquidity of an investment is the
ease with which it is convertible into cash or other acceptable medium with-
out shrinkage in value.55 Syndicate interests do not meet this description. This
fact stems partly from the absence of a formal secondary market which causes
50. See N.Y. Times, July 26, 1959, § 4 (News of the Week), p. 7, cols. 3-4 (map show-
ing New York City slums).
51. Id., Oct. 19, 1958, § 8, p. 1, col. 2, at 5, col. 1; id., Feb. 7, 1960, § 8, p. 1, col. 2;
Realty, Dec. 22, 1959, p. 14, col. 1 (some land prices along Third Avenue have jumped from
less than $10.00 to over $100.00 per square foot in ten years).
52. See CASE, MoDERN REAL ESTATE PRAcrncE 336-53 (1956); BLISS & SILL, REAL
ESTATE MANAGIENT (1950).
53. See M6rtgage Bankers Ass'n of America, Quarterly Economic Report of Trends
in the Mortgage Industry, Jan. 27, 1960, p. 1.
54. See, e.g., Leader-Cleveland Realty Associates, Prospectus, Aug. 5, 1958, pp. 6, 12
(30%) ; SIRE Plan, Inc., The Levittown Shopping Center, Unit One, Offering Circular,
Aug. 13, 1956, p. 8 (38%) ; The Teagen Co., Prospectus, Aug. 24, 1959, p. 11 (48%).
55. See generally 9 Ewcyc. Soc. Sci. 491-95 (1933).
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the syndicate investor wanting to dispose of his interest to invoke his own
resources in the effort to find an interested buyer.rc To some extent syndicate
managers have assisted in locating buyers, and a few promoters actively main-
tain an informal market in their securities, both as a convenience and to help
preserve investor morale.57 But these arrangements are temporary accom-
modations, and no assurance exists that they will be continued.
Quite commonly, one other factor vitally affects the liquidity of a syndicate
investment-a restriction upon its free alienability.58 While the nature of the
restraint varies with the syndicate, if one exists it is typically cast in one of
the following forms: the transfer of an investment interest must be to a mem-
ber of a recognized class ;9 the transferee must be approved by the syndicate
56. See Barron's, 'May 16, 1955, pp. 3, 20; Frankenthaler, Report to [N.Y.] Attorney
General Louis Lefkowitz, Feb. 17, 1958, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
The New York Real Estate Securities Exchange, Inc., an exchange specializing in real
estate securities, enjoyed a brief existence about thirty years ago. See Address by Cyrus C.
Miller, President, N.Y. Real Estate Securities Exchange, Inc., June 27, 1929, on file in the
New York City Public Library. For a statement of the Exchange's purposes, see its Direc-
tory published Sept. 17, 1938, on file in the New York City Public Library.
57. Real estate syndicators interviewed stated that they have noted little selling pres-
sure for their units, and that the offered interests have been readily marketed. They advance
the following reasons: (1) present investors are content since returns have been paid as
projected; (2) few investors are pressed for cash; (3) capital gains taxes deplete sales
proceeds where the adjusted cost basis is lower than the sales price because of prior returns
of capital distributions; (4) the higher yield older ventures exert a strong attraction for
outsider investment dollars. All those interviewed agreed, however, that the experience of
the past few years is no guide to the demand for syndicate units in the event of a significant
downward change in the economy.
See also The National Real Estate Investor, March 1960, p. 20 (independent firm opens
New York City office to "maintain a market for syndication interests").
58. UrForma Limrrim PARTNMSHip Acr § 19 permits a limited partner to assign his
interest freely; the assignee, however, does not gain the full "privileges" of a limited part-
ner until all remaining members approve him as a substituted limited partner. Until then,
he may share in the profits, but may not ask for the inspection of books or an accounting.
In most limited-partnership syndicates, only the general partners need consent to a substi-
tution. See, e.g., Motors Building Realty Co., Prospectus, Oct. 21, 1959, p. 11; National
Munsey Co., Copartnership Notice, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1959, p. 17, col. 6. But see Thirty
Four Associates, Articles of Limited Partnership, Aug. 11 1957, para. 15 (e) (2) (all mem-
bers must consent).
Whether a potential assignee of a limited partnership interest would consider detrimental
the restriction on his becoming a substituted limited partner is an open question. Since his
additional rights as a substituted partner matter little unless the venture begins to founder,
the would-be buyer, at the time of purchase, may not consider their possible absence a
weighty minus factor.
59. See, Motors Building Realty Co., Prospectus, Oct. 21, 1959, p. 11 ("any competent
person 21 years of age or older") ; Garment Capitol Associates, Prospectus, Feb. 13, 1957,
p. 10 ("any individual of full age") ; Davidson Court Associates, Copartnership Notice,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1, 1960, p. 16, col. 1 ("interest cannot be transferred to a... (non] resident
of the State of New York") ; Springfield Motel Co., Copartnership Notice, N.Y.LJ., Nov.
13, 1959, p. 17, col 4 ("spouse, child, or trustee for spouse or child").
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manager ;0o the nonselling interests reserve the right of first refusal. 01 Express
restraints on alienability are more likely to attend the noncorporate form of
syndicate entity, for 'by reducing the transferability of an investor interest, the
promoter hopes to forestall or blunt a later-day effort by the Internal Revenue
Service to label the syndicate a "taxable association. '0 2 But the restraint may
also appear in a context devoid of tax consequence if, for example, the pro-
moter simply wishes to be choosy about the identity of his investor associates.
For credit purposes, the collateral value of a noncorporate syndicate interest
is extremely limited. Some have said that a syndicate interest will never be
accepted as collateral 'by banks, 3 and it is doubtful whether, at the present
time, any New York 'bank will evaluate a prospective borrower's syndicate
participation unit for more than a small per cent of its value. In comparison,
the maximum loan-to-value ratio for high grade common stocks is approxi-
mately seventy per cent, and for Aaa municipal bonds ninety per cent.0' Some
evidence indicates that private money lenders will accept a syndicate interest
60. A limited partner may sell, assign or transfer his interest to any competent natural
person of full age, including the other limited or general partners, at any time, with
the consent of the general partners, which consent will not be refused unreasonably.
The Teagen Co., Prospectus, Aug. 24, 1959, p. 9.
61. See, e.g., the restriction set forth in Thirty Four Associates, Articles of Limited
Partnership, Aug. 1, 1957, pp. 7-8:
15. Each of the Partners agrees that he will not sell, transfer, assign, pledge, en-
cumber, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of the whole or any part of his interest in
the Partnership without complying with the provision of this paragraph 15.
(a) In the event that any Partner shall desire to sell, and shall receive a bona
fide written offer for, the whole or any part of his interest in the Partnership
... such Selling Party shall send a copy of such offer by certified mail to all of
the Partners, other than the Selling Party. Such offer shall thereupon be deemed
to be an offer by the Selling Party to sell to the other Partners ... the interest
offered upon the same terms and conditions as contained in the offer received by
the Selling Party.
Transfers to members of the immediate family, as defined, are excluded from the restric-
tion. Id. § 15(b). Furthermore, the general partners may, if in their sole discretion they
decide that the Partnership and other Partners would not be injured, permit free assign-
ability. Id. § 15(c).
An assignee does not, however, become a substituted Limited Partner without unani-
mous approval of the Partnership members. Id. § 15(e) (2). An assignee, who is not a sub-
stituted limited partner, receives distributions on his investment; but may not take part,
even to the slight extent available, in the entity affairs. Id. § 15(e) (1) ; see note 58 supra.
62. See N.Y. Hearings on Real Estate Syndication Before Han. George Frankenthaler,
Nov. 18, 1957, p. 23a; Aronsohn, Syndicates, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. 0N FED. TAX. 637, 644
(1958). See also text at notes 104-128 infra.
63. Interview With Louis Glickman, New York Syndicator, in New York City, Nov.
27, 1959; Address by Marvin Kratter, New York Syndicator, to Students of Yale Law
School, Nov. 12, 1958.
64. Interview With M. S. MacDonald, Vice-President, Irving Trust Company, in New
York -City, March 2, 1960.
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hypothecation at ratios more nearly approaching full value but at a higher
interest rate. 5
Since liquidity is absent, the purchase of a syndicate interest as a possible
short-term investment is unwarranted. Instead, the syndicate investor should
be financially able to ride his choice to the finish line, particularly if the foot-
ing becomes heavy.
Lack of investor control. With few exceptions, the syndicate investor does not
participate actively, either in the management of the property, or in the de-
cisions made by the syndicate entity. For most investors, the elimination of
direct management responsibility is welcomed; very few have both the time
and requisite skill. The management arrangements, however, do concern every
investor; for a successful syndicate venture depends upon someone's ability
to work the property to its maximum yield.
The syndicate seldom retains the direct management responsibility-the
"operating position"-in the property which it owns. Rather, it usually leases
its property on a long-term net rental basis, the amount of the rent being
tailored to produce an annual distribution to the investors at the yield adver-
tised in the offering.6 6 The syndicate promoter, his wholly-owned affiliate, or
a second syndicate group also under his control quite frequently takes the
operating position by becoming the tenant or subtenant of the syndicate en-
tity. 6 7 Alternatively the syndicate entity may enter into a lease or sublease with
an unaffiliated concern: most likely a former owner of the property who has
engineered a sale-leaseback transaction.68 Because the lease or sublease is ordi-
narily a long-term, net-rental instrument, effective control or management of
the property rests with the tenant. In its practical effect, the position of the
syndicate investor can be analogized to that of the tenant's bondholders. In
these circumstances, both the credit status of the tenant and the conditions of
the tenancy-the lease provisions for rent increases or overages, renewals,
termination, assignment, fire damage, condemnation-become highly signifi-
cant.
When the promoter wishes to retain the operating position, he rarely as-
sumes personal liability for the rental payment.9 Should the property fail to
65. Address by 'Marvin Kratter to Students of Yale Law School, Nov. 12, 1953; Inter-
view Vith Louis Glickman, New York Syndicator, in New York City, Nov. 27, 1959.
66. See Warwick Hotel Associates, Prospectus, July 13, 1955, pp. 10-11; Motors Build-
ing Realty Co., Prospectus, June 3, 1958, p. 8; 501 Fifth Realty Co., Brochure, Nov. 12,
1959, p. 8.
67. For the promoter as the tenant or subtenant of the syndicate group, see Stanbah
Realty Co., Brochure, Dec. 16, 1957, p. 6; Hotel Taft Associates, Prospectus, Jan. 2, 1958,
pp. 7-8 (second syndicate organized by promoter became the operating lessee).
68. For example, Pratney Associates, a Kratter syndicate, %was the buyer-lessor in a
1957 transaction with Pratt & Whitney Company, Inc., where the industrial concern sjld
and leased back its manufacturing and office site in West Hartford, Conn. The Kratter Corp.,
Prospectus, April 24, 1959, pp. 23-24.
69. See, e.g., Brocol Realty Co., Brochure, April 1959, p. 10 (promoter-affiliated cur-
poration is net-lessee) ; 501 Fifth Realty Co., Brochure, Nov. 12, 1959, p. 12 (same) ; Man-
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produce sufficient income, the promoter-lessee ordinarily reserves the right
either to reduce the net rental payment or to terminate the lease unilaterally. 0
In the event the lease is so terminated, the investors may be confronted with
the unexpected burden of undertaking new arrangements for the property's
management, presumably at a time when the going is rough.
Even when the syndicate entity retains the operating position, the promoter
may arrange to manage the property at an agreed-upon fee or percentage for
his services.71 Sometimes the syndicate 'hires an independent real estate con-
cern.7-2 In contrast with promoter management, a real estate firm may offer
know-how, financial responsibility, and previous familiarity with the property.
As offsetting factors, however, outside management lacks the promoter's in-
centive to maximize rentals and syndicate profits and may also 'be torn by
conflicts of interest 'based upon its similar duties in regard to competing prop-
erties.
Not only is the syndicate investor a nonparticipant in the property manage-
ment, but he may have little or no voice in the decisionmaking process of the
syndicate entity. These decisions include the making of management or rental
arrangements, borrowing, refinancing, the amount and timing of distributions,
the appointment of accountants and of counsel, selection of the controlling
group, refraining the organizational mode and the acquisition or sale of prop-
erty.
In part, the degree of investor control derives from the legal form of the
syndicate entity. If a limited partnership 'has been created, the rights of a
limited partner are circumscribed by the particular jurisdiction's version of
section 10 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.73 He may examine the
company's books, count his profits, obtain an accounting and seek dissolution;
queens SIRE Plan, Inc., Offering Circular, June 14, 1956, pp. 7, 16 (same). See also Gar-
ment Capitol 'Associates, Prospectus, Feb. 13, 1957, p. 3 (lessee promoters assume personal
liability for first 3 years of 25 year lease).
70. Fairly typical is the arrangement connected With the syndication of the General
Motors Building (N.Y.C.) leasehold. The investors purchased the leasehold from the Gliek-
man Corp. of Nevada, then subleased the building back to the Glickman concern under a
sublease having a term and renewal option similar to the ones in the leasehold. The sub-
lessee promoter-affiliate agreed to pay the investors a fixed annual rental, and undertook
all costs of operation and maintenance, including ground rental. But the sublessee reserved
the privilege of assigning the sublease, or "surrendering same to the Partnership on 60 days
notice," without further liability. Motors Building Realty Co., Prospectus, June 3, 1.958, p,
10.
71. For examples of management by the promoter's affiliate where the syndicate group
retains the operating position, see The Teagen Co., Prospectus, Aug. 24, 1959, p. 8; SIRE
Post Office Plan, Inc., Amended Offering Circular, Sept. 15, 1959, p. 6.
72. See National Munsey Co., Prospectus, Nov. 20, 1959, p. 7 (management company
awarded ten year contract at 3% of gross rentals).
73. See, e.g., N.Y. PARTN sHIP LAW § 99; N.J. STA'. ANN. § 42:2-14 (Supp. 1959);
CAL. CoRP'. CODE AN. § 15510. Thirty-nine states have enacted the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act. See 8 UNxroam LAws AxN. 7 (Supp. 1959).
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the exercise of greater rights may transform his status to that of a general
partner 74 and expose him to unlimited liability.
The corporate form of syndicate venture does not appreciably increase in-
vestor control. Typically, the corporate investor acquires a combination of
debentures and nonvoting preferred stock.75 All of the voting power rests in
the few shares of common stock held solely by the syndicate promoter. 3 Only
in the event of a protracted default in the payment of debenture interest and
preferred stock dividends do the voting rights, and thereby control, shift to
the investor.77
The use of the general partnership, in which the general partner divides
his interest among the syndicate investors who then participate with him as
joint venturers, 78 can offer the investor a somewhat higher level of control. In-
74. For the view that a limited partner may make suggestions and state opinions as to
business conduct without assuming a general partner's liability, see, e.g., Silvola v. Rowlett,
129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954) ; SkohLy v. Richter, 139 App. Div. 534, 124 N.Y. Supp.
152 (1910). How far a limited partner may go in offering "advice" is unclear. Compare
Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 Pf2d 848 (1957), with Holzman Y. De Escamilla,
86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
Although the general partners have the right to make the decision unilaterally, they
sometimes represent that they do not intend to sell partnership prorerty without written
approval of a stated percentage of the limited partnership interests. See Glen Oaks Shopping
Center Realty Co., Brochure, May 26, 1959, p. 13 (80%) ; Lord Elgin Hotel Co., Prospec-
tus, Aug. 28, 1958, p. 10 (65%).
75. See SIRE Post Office Plan, Inc., Amended Offering Circular, Sept. 15, 1959. p. 5
(investment package consisting of one $5 debenture bearing 7% interest and one share uf
$3.50 cumulative preferred stock selling for $50).
76. Id. at 10-11. Aside from the possible loss of voting control discussed in note 77 infra,
the common stockholders accepted a potential limit on their exclusive right to make a pro-
posed sale, leasehold, merger, consolidation, or increased capitalization. If a majority of the
preferred stockholders do not approve the proposal and at least one-third of the preferred
stockholders state their disapproval in writing after notice, the action is blocked.
Holders of one-third or more of the debentures may similarly block the incurring of cer-
tain corporate obligations, unless the borrowings are for (a) "corporate purposes," (b)
reduction of the outstanding debentures, or (c) mortgage refinancing. Note that the pre-
ferred stockholders as preferred stockholders do not receive even this narrowed privilege,
perhaps because of the fear that a court might construe the granting of limited voting
power as a grant of the voting powers provided for in N.Y. STocx CoR'. Ltw § 16 (two-
thirds of a corporation's stockholders entitled to vote must consent to a mortgage of cor-
porate realty).
77. SIRE Post Office Plan, Inc., Amended Offering Circular, Sept. 15, 1959, p. 10. The
preferred stockholders may elect a majority of directors if the corporation fails to pay or
"set aside and provide for" preferred stock dividends for any two consecutive years. When
all arrears have been fully paid or set aside for payment, the voting rights revert to the
common stockholders. Query: What does "set aside and provide for" mean?
78. Lawrence Vien, a New York attorney, has been the leading enthusiast for the gen-
eral partnership mode of real estate syndication. A typical Wien venture was the 1958 pur-
chase of Cleveland's Leader Building for more than four million dollars. Wien and his law
partner, William Purcell, formed a general partnership, Leader-Cleveland Realty Asso-
ciates. The two ground-floor partners each invested $10,000 and received a one-half interest.
Together they raised an additional $1,280,000 on a public offering; an existing mortgage
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vestor control, however, is usually limited by the partnership agreement, which
delegates the ultimate decisionmaking power to the promoter partner as agent
for the investor partners.79 In this capacity, the promoter needs investor con-
sent only for stated major decisions, such as lease or mortgage modification
or the sale, transfer, and mortgaging of the property. Furthermore, this sem-
blance of residual investor control over major policy is rendered somewhat
illusory; for if most of the partners approve the proposal the promoter usual-
ly has the right to reacquire the interests of the nonconsenting investors.80
And the "buy-out" price, normally original cost less previous capital distribu-
tions, does not reflect any increment in the equity value of the investment in-
terest.8 1 Thus, the pressure of a forced sale upon potentially undesirable terms
undercuts the likelihood that an investor will assert himself.
Where does this leave the syndicate promoter? Except for the minimal
limitations to which he may agree, he retains almost exclusive power, regard-
financed the remaining purchase price. Each public investor, as he acquired an interest in
Leader-Cleveland Realty Associates, became a joint venturer with either Wien or Purcell.
As joint venturers with a general partner, the investors were individually responsible for
the full amount of partnership liabilities. Leader-Cleveland Realty Associates, Prospectus,
Aug. 5, 1958, pp. 3, 7. Although the investors agree to a contingent risk not present in the
limited partnership or corporate format, Mr. Wien feels that the fact of unlimited liability
of all investors may help insulate his ventures from "taxable association" treatment. See
note 12 supra; text at notes 114-17 infra. The risk may be a token one. The syndicate par-
ticipants are -not personally liable on the mortgage debt, and many of the other exposures--
e.g., fire, tort liability, workmen's compensation, are insurable. In addition, by making a net
lease, the syndicate transfers to the operating tenant liability for operating expenses.
79. See Warwick Hotel Associates, Prospectus, July 13, 1955, pp. 8-9; Leader-Cleve-
land Realty Associates, Prospectus, Aug. 5, 1958, pp. 8-9. The Wien coventurers, see note
78 supra, are given the right to remove an agent by the written direction of participants
owning at least three-fourths of the agent's interest. However, the displaced agent would
be succeeded by nominees previously selected by the ground-floor partners. See note 84 infra.
80. See Warwick Hotel Associates, Prospectus, July 13, 1955, p. 8. In his earlier ven-
tures, Wien's ground-floor partners, see notes 86, 87 supra, needed 90% approval from each
group of joint-venture investors to effect major decisions. Ibid. The requisite percentage
is now 80%. See Leader-Cleveland Realty Associates, Prospectus, Aug. 5, 1958, p. 8. Con-
trast this with the two-thirds stockholders' approval required for certain sales or mort-
gages of corporate real estate under N.Y. STocx Coat. LAW § 20. The difference may have
relevance in distinguishing a Wien general partnership from an association taxable as a
corporation. See text at notes 118-28 in!ra.
81. See Leader-Cleveland Realty Associates, Prospectus, Aug. 5, 1958, p. 8. If the dis-
tributions projected in this prospectus are realized and accorded the expected tax treatment,
after five years each investor will have received approximately $2,500 in nontaxable dis-
tributions per $10,000 unit. Id. at 10. (The Internal Revenue Code treats this distribution
as a return of capital which the taxpayer must deduct from his adjusted cost basis. See
notes 95, 96 infra; INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 301(c) (2).) Should an investor then dis-
approve a planned sale, refinancing, etc., and not less than 80% of the investors in each joint
venture group accepted the plan, the general partners could buy back the $10,000 unit for
$7,500.
In addition, after the forced sale, if he were to recompute what he had earned on his
investment for the five years, the investor would find that his annual return had been about
8%, rather than the 12% projected in the prospectus.
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less of the syndicate form, to make all major investment decisions--power
which he attempts to justify by claiming that investment decisions must be
made swiftly by experienced, centralized personnel.8 2 Even though the pro-
moter's judgment within his authority be unsound, the investor is remediless
in damages in the absence of a showing of bad faith, fraud or culpable gross
negligence . 3 Finally, centralized control is self-perpetuating; for upon a pro-
moter's death, resignation, or legal incompetency, his handpicked coterie, and
not the investor, decides whether and how the syndicate entity is to con-
tinue.84
The Uncertain Haven of "Tax Sheltcr." Federal income tax considerations
pervade every real estate syndication.8 5 Form, capitalization, and internal ar-
rangements, as well as the venture's attractiveness to many investors, depend
significantly upon a few provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. In shaping
the enterprise, the syndicator customarily seeks to maximize not only the in-
vestor's yield, but also the nontaxability of his investment, to furnish "tax
shelter" to the investor.80 The size of the shelter will depend on the amount
of depreciation deductible as an operating expense.8, Since depreciation de-
ductions do not reflect actual expenditures, allowing depreciation permits a
cash flow to investors in excess of taxable income. This excess is treated as
82. This is the author's inference from interviews during 1959 with six leading Xew
York syndicators.
83. See CRA.m, PARTNERSHIP § 68, & 36S n.87 (2d ed. 1952). See also Urrunn Lima TU
PARTNERSHIP Acr § 9(1).
For the liability of promoters, officers and directors of corporate syndicates, see Lvrz-,
CORPORATIOxS §§ 10, 12 (1959).
84. See, e.g., Motors Building Realty Co., Prospectus, Oct. 21, 1959, p. 11:
... [I]n the event of the death, retirement, bankruptcy or inc¢mpetency L-f a
General Partner, the Partnership will be dissolved. But the remaining General Part-
ners shall have the right to form a new partnership to conduct the business of the
old Partnership on substantially the same terms.
Accord, Leader-Cleveland Realty Associates, Prospectus, Aug. 5, 1958, p. 8 ("If the Agent
dies, is removed, resigns or is unable to act, he will be succeeded ty one of four pers 'ns
named as successors in each agreement.").
85. See generally Brudno, Syndicates and Income Taxation, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF RFAL ESTATE BRoIE:RS, REAl. ESTAT SYN'DICATES AND How TuyV WoaK 11 (1957);
Pennish, The Story of Real Estate Syndication-Tax Advanlagcs and Disadvantages, Tax
Counselor's Q., June 1959, p. 111.; Janin, The Why and How of Real Estate Syvdications:
Tax Aspects, Prac." Law., March 1959, p. 60; Asch, Tax Considerations it; Real Estate
Syndication, 3 ViLT. L. REv. 469 (1958); Aronsohn, Syndicates, N.Y.U. 16T1 INsT. ON
FED. TAx. 637 (1958) ; Casey, How To Detennine Best Form for Real Estate Syndicates
To Preserve Tax Advantages, 7 J. TAXATiOx 328 (1957) ; Spandorf, Real Estate Syndi-
cates: How To Organize, Operate and Sell Them for Tax Advantages, 6 J. TA-x.rzo- 44
(1957); White, How To Prevent Real Estate Venture Being Taxed as a Corporation, 12
J. TAXATION 48 (1960); White, Current Tax Planning in Real Estate Transactions-The
Real Estate Syndicate, U. So. CAL. 1959 TAx INST. 851.
86. See The Levittown Shopping Center, Unit One, Offering Circular, Aug. 13, 1956,
p. 9; 501 Fifth Realty Co., Brochure, Nov. 12, 1959, p. 9.
87. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167.
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a tax-free return of capital.88 As a countervailing factor, cash outlays for
mortgage repayment 89 and capital improvements 00 are not deductible when
made, despite their drain upon cash resources. Thus, any surplus of deprecia-
tion, on the one 'hand, over debt amortization plus capital expenditures, on
the other, creates actual cash receipts greater than, and free from the levy on,
net taxable income.91 And, 'by affording property owners a choice of depre-
ciation techniques, the Code enables him to manipulate the amount of this
tax-free surplus. 92 In general, syndicate promoters have tended to accelerate
depreciation allowances during the venture's infancy,93 thereby maximizing
the nontaxable portion of the investment yield at the outset. But the potenti-
ality of tax-sheltered income is solely dependent on the amount deductible as
depreciation. Thus, as depreciation is taken and the property's depreciable
basis reduced, the property's capacity to give rise to tax-free income de-
creases.
94
88. An example of depreciation-generated cash flow, in its simplest form would be:
Net Income Before Depreciation 40,000
Allowance for Depreciation 40,000
Net Taxable Income -0--
Although the taxpayer has no taxable income, its cash supply (omitting mortgage amor-
tization and capital investment) has increased $40,000 during the taxable period.
89. See 2 P-H 1960 FED. TAX SEr. 1 11342.
90. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 263.
91. The following example, taken from an actual syndicate projection, illustrates the
generation of tax-free income.
Rental Income $337,980 Rental Income $337,980
Deductible Cash
Expenses: Expenses:
Interest on Interest on
Mortgages $ 97,639 Mortgages $ 97,639
Miscellaneous 4,000 Miscellaneous 4,000
Depreciation 166,158 Mortgage Amor-
267,797 267,797 tization 60,341
161,980 161,980
Cash Available
Net Taxable Income $ 70,183 for Distribution $176,000
The excess of depreciation over mortgage amortization payments, i.e., $105,817, is free from
the income tax levy. 501 Fifth Realty Co., Brochure, Nov. 12, 1959, p. 8.
92. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(b)-(c).
93. See, e.g., The Kratter'Corp., Prospectus, April 24, 1959, p. 4, reproduced as Ap-
pendix I on pages 792-93. Even the use of the more conservative straight-line depreciation is
likely to generate tax-free income. See, e.g., Dyckman Hotel Associates, Prospectus, Jan.
27, 1959, p. 9.
94. Promoters are also alert to other tax considerations. See generally Weissbourd,
Tax Planning in Real Estate Transactions, 37 TAxES 1118 (1959). They seek to avoid
double taxation of income by avoiding the corporate form. Although the Code added, in
1958, a partnership election for the corporation having ten or fewer members, the corporate
syndicate, if it derives more than 20% of its gross receipts from rental, cannot qualify. INT.
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The lure of tax-sheltered income tends to obscure the actual investment re-
ward. The Code deems a distribution from a depreciation reserve a return of
invested capital.9Z The investor, however, frequently equates the annual a-
mount the syndicate pays to him with the income generated by his invest-
ment. For example, a syndicate investor who receives an annual payment of
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371, 1372. A closely knit group of wealthy syndicate investors might
actually prefer the corporate form if they are ready to forego periodic distributions. The
combination of a corporate tax and a capital-gains tax on a stock sale or § 337 dissolution
might be less of a bite than the levy imposed on an individual partner's share of partnership
income.
Promoters also seek to generate "paper" operating losses which investors can use as
an offset against individual income. Thus, the allowance for depreciation or leasehold amor-
tization may produce a net loss for income tax purposes, even though a cash flow is avail-
able for distribution. See, e.gr, The Kratter Corp., Prospectus, April 24, 1959, p. 4 (Thirty-
Four Associates Syndicate). A partner may report on his individual return, as an offset to
other income, his distributive share of partnership loss, to the extent of his adjusted basis.
TNr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704. His basis, however, may include, in addition to the cost of
his investment unit, his share of the partnership's mortgage debt, even if he is not personal-
ly liable on the mortgage. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 752(a), (c). By contrast, current
operating losses of a corporation are not deductible on the shareholder's individual return.
Any reduction in the shareholder's tax stemming from the corporation's operating losses is
generally deferred until sale of stock or liquidation, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301-07, when
it may be treated as a capital loss, IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1211, 1221-23.
Another means of minimizing taxes is by providing for mortgage refinancings in excess
of the amount of the current debt. This excess may be distributable tax-free, since distri-
butions by a partnership aot based on the partnership's taxable earnings reduce the partners'
adjusted cost basis, and are tax-free until the basis is reduced to zero. Thereafter, the re-
ceipt of such distributions will be treated as gain from the sale or exchange of a partner-
ship interest. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 731, 733. In contrast, the full amount of such dis-
tributions by corporations would be taxable to stockholders as dividends, assuming the cor-
poration had earnings and profits. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301, 316.
Finally, most syndicates seek capital gains treatment, under Inr. RE%. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 1221, 1231, on resales of syndicate property.
Those syndicates which may be characterized as dealers in real estate will realize ordi-
nary income upon disposition of their properties. IN'r. REV. -CODE OF 1954, §§ 1221, 1231(b)
(1) (A), (B). Query: Under what circumstances will a syndicate be found to be a dealer
for income-tax purposes?
Upon the sale of partnership assets, if it is treated as a § 1231 or § 1221 capital gain to
the partnership entity, individual investors will pay a capital gains tax, even though they
are themselves "dealers" in real estate. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 702(b). Corporate stock-
holders, on the other hand, pay no tax following a sale of the corporate assets until receipt
of the distributions. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 301.
The sale or exchange of a partnership interest by a partner dealing in real estate could
result in the recognition of ordinary income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 751 (a), (d). This
result is also possible when one holds an interest in a collapsible corporation, INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 341. See generally Levy, Real Estate Partberships, N.Y.U. 16Ti IN.-sT. ox
FED. TAX. 183, 184, 196-203 (1958).
95. If a distribution is not made out of "earnings and profits" as defined in INer. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 316, it is a return of capital under Ierx. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301 (c) (2)-
(3). See Bn-rzm, FEDERAL IxcOmE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARMouuns 131,
138-78 (1959).
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1,200 dollars on a 10,000-dollar investment may view his return as a twelve
per cent yield, and therefore far superior to, let us say, six per cent interest
on a first mortgage investment. If, however, 800 dollars of the syndicate dis-
tribution is tax-free, and thereby considered a return of capital, only the re-
maining 400 dollars would 'be styled as earnings-a four per cent return on
the initial 10,000-dollar investment. Obviously this is well below the twelve
per cent "yield" the syndicate promised. Nonetheless, in each succeeding year,
the investor's adjusted cost basis, that is his investment, decreases 'by the a-
mount of his annual receipts which are tax-free, while his annual receipts
remain constant in amount; thus his yield (income: investment) can eventu-
ally exceed the anticipated twelve per cent.OG Furthermore, even after the syn-
dicate investor has recaptured fully his initial investment, he may, unlike the
mortgage investor, continue to get distributions. Finally, syndicators counter
the theory that tax-free distributions are really returAs of capital and not in-
come generated by the syndicate property ,by claiming that what the fantasy
land of the 'Code treats as a return of capital is, in the real world, mostly a
dividend paid out of income. They argue that only payment generated by that
portion of the depreciation deduction which represents actual physical wear
and tear is, in an economic sense, a return of capitalY7
96. The following table illustrates the difference in yields between combined income
and return of capital, on the one hand, and income only, on the other. The table is based on
projections contained in Motors Building Realty Co., Prospectus, Oct. 21, 1959, p. 9. The
offering price, per limited partnership unit, is $5,000; $500 (10%) annual distributions of
income and return of capital are expected.
Income Rate of
Adjusted Cost Basis Return i.e.,
Fiscal at Start of Return of Income
Year Fiscal Year Income Capital Adjusted Cost Basis
1959 $5,000 $213 $287 4.26%
1960 4,713 219 281, 4.65%
1961 4,432 225 275 5.08%
1962 4,157 231 269 5.56%
1963 3,988 238 262 6.12%
1964 3,636 245 255 6.75%
1965 3,371 253 247 7.51%
1966 3,124 261 239 8.35%
1967 2,885 270 230 9.36%
1968 2,655 279 221 10.51%
1969 2,434 288 212 11.83%
1970 2,222 298 202 13.41%
1971 2,020 309 191 15.30%
97. Interview With J. M. Tenney, New York Syndicator, in New York City, Nov. 27,
1959.
In painting a bright picture of the yield which syndicate investors will receive, promoters
often overlook the facts that the spread between the optimistic income projections and fixed
expenses of many syndicated properties is quite small, 501 Fifth Realty Co., Brochure, Nov.
12, 1959, p. 13 (9%) ; Brocol Realty Co., Brochure, April, 1959, p. 7 (10%) ; Madison-54th
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An additional tax risk for the investor is Internal Revenue Service dis-
allowance of the various components of the depreciation schedule, such as
method and rate, estimate of useful asset life, and land-improvement alloca-
tion.9s Section 167(d) of the Internal Revenue Code offers the promoter an
opportunity to minimize this risk, for it authorizes the Secretary of the Treas-
ury or his delegate to execute binding agreements with taxpayers as to the
useful life, method and rate of depreciation, and salvage value of any prop-
erty.99 But the basis for depreciation, including land-improvement allocation,
cannot be encompassed by agreement, and an unfavorable ruling might await
the initial tax return. 0 0
Accelerated depreciation at the outset of a venture may have untoward tax
consequences in the future. Frequently, the imbalance between taxable income
and cash income will be reversed after several years of operation. Instead of
cash earnings upon which no tax is payable, ventures may accrue taxes upon
money already spent for amortization and capital improvements.10 In unin-
corporated enterprises investors would then have to report as income, and pay
taxes on, earnings never received.' 0 2 Perhaps the investor will accept the de-
ferred nature of his liability; but it is more likely that he will expect pro-
Realty Co., Brochure [undated], p. 4 (8%), and even a slight drop in earnings or increase
in expenses may reduce the yield on the underlying investment units. Moreover, even if no
catastrophic drop in earnings occurs, the investor's anticipated high yield may be cut off,
should he dissent from a plan of sale or refinancing approved by most of his coventurers,
since at least one large syndicator reserves the privilege to repurchase the dissenter's in-
vestment interest at its adjusted cost basis, regardless of its realizable market worth. See,
e.g., Hotel Taft Associates, Prospectus, Jan. 2, 1958, p. 9. Nor should the investor forget,
when translating yield into rate of return, that if he sells his investment unit, taxes may
then be payable on earlier capital distributions which reduced his cost basis. See INT. Rv.
CODE OF 1954, § 733. The transaction will usually be treated as the sale or exchange of a
capital asset held for longer than six months. See IxT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 1221 ; note 94
sura.
98. The burden is on the taxpayer to overcome the presumption of the correctness of
the Commissioner's determination. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Hotels Co. v. Commissioner, 43
F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1930), reversing 15 B.T.A. 587 (1929).
99. If the taxpayer has an existing agreement covering other property having the "same
characteristics," the Commissioner will probably permit the depreciation rate in the agree-
ment to apply to the newly acquired property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(d)-i (1956) ; 1957-1
Cum. BuLa. 737. Compare 2 CCH 1960 STAND. FE. TAx REP. 1742.05.
100. After the initial return, the danger lessens since it is the policy of the Internal
Revenue Service not to disturb depreciation deductions except when there is a clear and
convincing basis for a change. Rev. Rul. 90, 1953-1 Cuam. Bum.. 43.
101. For syndications in which the promoters expect amortization to exceed deprecia-
tion, see The Teagen Co., Prospectus, Aug. 24, 1959, p. 12 (aften tenth year) ; Lord Elgin
Hotel Co., Prospectus, Aug. 28, 1959, p. 13 (after fifteenth year).
Prior to the crossover point, the portion of nontaxable return of capital in the syndicate
distribution declines steadily. Ibid. For the investor seeking to sell his participation unit, the
decreasingly favorable tax treatment may further impair his liquidity. See text at notes 55-
65 supra.
102. Each partner must pay tax on his distributive share of partnership income whether
or not it is distributed to him. INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 702(a).
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moters to take some ameliorative action. Several procedures are potentially
available: a switch to straight-line depreciation 103 in order to increase annual
deductions, mortgage refinancing to reduce amortization payments, and dis-
position of the property. None of these is entirely satisfactory, however, and
they may not be feasible when action is most desirable.
Although depreciation is the source of tax-sheltered income, the investors'
ultimate enjoyment of its 'benefits may depend upon the promoter's choice of
the syndicate's organizational form. For many purposes, the syndicator might
prefer incorporation. 0 4 But the burden of the corporate income tax,103 the
spectre of "collapsible corporation,"' 06 and the stockholder's inability to reflect
corporate losses upon his personal return, 'have curtailed 'widespread use of
103. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(e) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(e)-I (1956) ; Rev.
Rul. 57-5J0, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 152.
The Commissioner's consent is needed for any change in depreciation method, except
for a switch from double-declining-balance to straight-line. And even this exception will
require consent if the depreciation method was covered by previous agreement. See note 99
srupra.
The following example illustrates the utility of this approach.
Assume the cost basis of depreciable property, having a useful life of I0 years, is $100,-
000. The property produces annual revenue of $10,000 after mortgage interest and before
depreciation. The annual mortgage payments for amortization were $8,000.
If the double-declining-balance method of depreciation were elected, a rate of 20% would
apply. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(b) (2) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b) (2) (1956). This pro-
duces the following results:
Depreciation Taxable
Year Revenues Amortization Allowed Cash Yield Income
1 10,000 8,000 20,000 2,000 -0-
2 10,000 8,000 16,000 2,000 -0--
3 10,000 8,000 12,800 2,000 -0--
4 10,000 8,000 10,240 2,000 -- 0--
5 10,000 8,000 8,192 2,000 1,808
6 10,000 8,000 6,554 2,000 3,446
Switch to Straight-Line Method
After 2d Year
1 10,000 8,000 20,000 2,000 -0-
2 10,000 8,000 16,000 2,000 0
3 10,000 8,000 8,000 2,000 2,000
4 10,000 8,000 8,000 2,000 2,000
5 10,000 8,000 8,000 2,000 2,000
104. See generally BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATIoNs §§ 1, 2 (1946).
105. The corporation must pay a tax of 30% on the first $25,000, and 52% on the ex-
cess. INIT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11. Distributions by the corporation are then taxed again to
the individual stockholders as dividend income. The stockholders may, however, realize
capital gains by the sale of their stock before the dividends are @aid. INT. Rav. CODE OF
1954, §§ 301, 1221.
106. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341. For an excellent and concise analysis of the
intricate details of § 341 see BITInKER, FEERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA TIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS §§ 10.01-.07 (1959).
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the syndicate corporation. 07 Some syndicators have ventured to structure cor-
porations with a high proportion of unsecured debt to stock,108 thereby reduc-
ing taxable corporate income; but the "thin capitalization" doctrine, which
treats what seems to be debt as stock, poses a serious threat to this device.102
Having rejected corporate organization, syndicators usually select either the
limited or general partnership. But the partnership form is itself straddled with
uncertain tax consequences-an outgrowth of the "taxable association" doc-
trine. "Association" is a category designed to envelop in the corporate-tax
fold those entities which resemble, but are not labeled, corporations. Nearly a
generation ago, the United States Supreme Court, in Morrissey v. Commis-
sioner,110 branded a business trust a taxable association. In explaining its re-
sult, the Court relied on the trust's resemblance to a corporation: (1) title in
the entity, (2) limited liability of participants, (3) centralized management
acting in a representative capacity, and (4) continuity of existence despite
the death of a participant or the transfer of a participating interest."' Later
cases made clear that partnerships are included in the thrust of Morrisscy." -
What the Supreme Court did not say was whether, in a succeeding case,
the absence of any one or more of the Morrissey criteria would avoid the
"association" label and, conversely, whether the presence of any one or more
of the Morrissey criteria would necessarily evoke the "association" tag. One
safe assertion, in viewing the development of Morrisscy, is that the first crite-
rion, the fact or nonfact of titleholding in the entity, has little relevance, par-
ticularly since the Uniform Partnership Act expressly recognizes the right of
any partnership to hold real estate in the partnership name. 13 Commentators
have tended also to dismiss limited liability as a significant factor, if at least
one investor-e.g., the general partner in a limited partnership-has unlimited
liability."14 When every partner's liability is limited, as in the limited partner-
107. See note 94 supra.
108. See SIRE Post Office Plan, Inc., Amended Offering Circular, Sept. 15, 1959, p. 5.
109. See Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956),
afflrming 23 T.C. 408 (1954) ; Miller's Estate v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.
1956), reversing 24 T.C. 923 (1955); Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.d 118 (2d
Cir. 1956), reversing 21 T.C. 513 (1954); Comment, Thc Thin Incorporation Problem:
Are the Courts Fighting the Tar Baby?, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 275 (1958) ; Spanbock, Carro
& Katz, Nourishing the Thin Corporation, 34 T.&xLs 687 (1956).
110. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
111. Id. at 359.
112. Kintner v. United States, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); Poplar Bluff Printing Co.
v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1945). See also J. A. Riggs Tractor Co., 6 T.C.
889 (1946).
113. Ux mvas PARTNERsRip AcT § 8(3). By 1959, thirty-eight states had enacted uni-
form partnership legislation. See 7 UNxoam LAws AzNN. 7 (Supp. 1959).
The limited partnership derives its right to hold real estate in the firm name from § 6(2)
of the Uniform Partnership 'Act which provides .... this act shall apply to limited part-
nerships except in so far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent here-
with'
114. See Smith, Associations Classified as Corporatimts Under the Internal Revenue
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ship association," 5 or when a limited partnership's sole general partner is a
corporation," 6 the corporate resemblance may, however, .be conclusive. Even
if every investor has unlimited liability, this fact alone may not immunize the
venture from "taxable association" treatment.117
The interpretation of Morrissey which has taken shape in the literature 118
has narrowed the relevant criteria so that a partnership may avoid the "asso-
ciation" label if it lacks either centralized management in a representative
capacity or continuity. The commentators, however, have given no content to
Code, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 461, 527 (1946); Levy, Real Estate Partnerships, N.Y.U. 16TI
INST. ON FED. TAX. 183, 188 (1958) ; Driscoll, The Association Problem in Joint Ventures
and Limited Partnerships, N.Y.U. 17T INST. ON FED. TAX. 1067, 1075 (1959). But see
Proposed Treas. Regs. §§ 301,7701-1 to -4, 24 Fed. Reg. 10451-55 (1959) (limited liability
named as one of major characteristics to distinguish association from partnership).
115. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 241 (1930); Micn. STAT. ANN. § 20.91 (1959);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:3-1 (1939); Omo Rzv. CODE ANN. § 1783.01 (Page 1953); Giant
Auto Parts, Ltd., 13 T.C. 307 (1949) (Ohio limited partnership association held taxable
association).
116. A majority of courts have held that corporations do not have the power to become
partners, unless expressly authorized to do so by charter or statute. See ,Annot., 60 A.L.R.
2d 917, 920 (1956) (collecting cases). Most of the cases justify this rule on the rationale
that corporation statutes require the exercise of corporate powers by a board of directors,
thus precluding a corporation from being bound by outsiders who may be its partners. See,
e.g., Frieda Popkov Corp. v. Stack, 198 Misc. 826, 103 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 1950). The
reasoning may not apply to cases where the corporation is the sole general partner. Cf. Port
Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow, 155 Tex. 612, 291 S.W.2d 312 (1956).
117. See Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925) ; Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(g), 24 Fed. Reg. 10452 (1959) (in examples (1) and (5) certain ven-
tures are taxed as associations even though each investor has unlimited liability).
Two proposals have been made to relieve both corporated and unincorporated real estate
syndicates of the corporate tax burden. One suggestion would extend the subchapter S elec-
tion, see note 102 supra, to corporations deriving more than 20% of their earnings from
rental income, see 10 J. TAXATION 19 (1959) ; National Real Estate Investor, Jan. 1960,
p. 23. The change would be of limited benefit since the subchapter S election is available
only to businesses having not more than ten shareholders and requires unanimous investor
consent. INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371.(a), 1372(a).
The second proposal would extend the advantageous tax treatment of regulated invest-
ment companies to real estate trusts specializing in real estate equities and mortgages. See
S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-69 (1958). Regulated investment companies are
taxed only on their undistributed income, if they distribute at least 90% of their ordinary
income. Capital gains realized by the company are treated as capital gains in the hands of
the recipient. I NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 852. The trust proposal, however, applies only to a
passive trust, i.e., a venture not engaged in "active business operations." See S. Rr,. No.
1983, supra at 68. Although most syndications do not operate their properties directly, see
text at note 66 supra, and would probably qualify as passive trusts, if the operating tenants
were to default and force the syndicate group to take over the reins, the trust treatment
would be lost, at least during the period of direct syndicate management. The real estate
trust proposal was adopted by the Senate in 1958, but was scrapped by the Conference Com-
mittee. Architectural F., Sept. 1958, p. 6.




these phrases, so that a review of the post-Morrissey "association" develop-
ments is desirable.
Morrissey was followed ,by regulations which listed, for several organiza-
tional forms, the features necessary to support an "association" finding.110 The
relevant language from the limited-partnership regulation reads:
If the organization is not interrupted by the death of a general partner
or by a change in the ownership of his participating interest, and if the
management of its affairs is centralized in one or more persons acting in
a representative capacity, it is taxable as a corporation. For want of these
essential characteristics, a limited partnership is to be considered as an
ordinary partnership .... 120
Shortly after the regulations were issued, the Board of Tax Appeals decided
Glensder Textile Co.,'-" which involved a limited partnership formed by four
men as a means of bringing their wives into their business, presumably to split
taxes. The husbands, who invested five-twelfths of the venture capital, became
general partners and retained managerial control. Upon the death of any hus-
band, the partnership was to terminate, although the surviving general part-
ners might reconstitute within thirty days. The limited-partner wives were
permitted to assign their interests freely. Against the Commissioner's effort to
tax this venture as an association by stressing centralized management and
continuity, the Board held that this limited partnership was not a taxable
entity. Its opinion pointed out that, despite centralized management, the gen-
eral partners were not acting "merely in a representative capacity," since they
(unlike the Morrissey trustees) had their own five-twelfths interest to man-
age as well as that of the silent investors. Furthermore, unlike corporate direc-
tors, the general partners could not be voted in or out of office. Nor did the
Board, in considering continuity, accept the Commissioner's claim that the
venture would survive the death of a general partner. That the remaining
general partners would choose to reconstitute was at best a contingency, not
at all like the assured life of the Morrissey trust or a corporation.
Even though the Glensder taxpayers were able to satisfy the Board that
their entity did not too closely resemble a corporation, the reliance of both tax-
payers and Commissioner upon tests offered in the same set of regulations sug-
gests that the regulations have not been a steady guide for tax planning. As a
preliminary inquiry, what predictive value is the regulation's key phrase "[cen-
tralized] ... management.., in a representative capacity," for a syndicator
who wants to retain sole control of the venture while avoiding association
status? If the syndicator's personal investment is "substantial," according to
119. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.3797-3 (1939) (association distinguished from trust) ; Treas.
Reg. 103, § 19.37974 (1939) (partnership) ; Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.3797-5 (1939) (limited
partnership) ; Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.3797-6 (1939) (partnership association).
120. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.3797-5 (1939), as amended, T.D. 4894, 1939-1 Cum. BULL.
79.
121. 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), acq., 1942-1 Cum. BuLL. 8.
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some analyses, he is acting in his own 'behalf and not representatively. 2 2 But
what is a "substantial" investment? The Glensder general partners had a
forty-two per cent investment in their venture, and passed the test. Syndicate
promoters, on the other 'hand, seldom acquire more than a fifteen per cent
paper interest in their ventures, and their cash investments are often much
lower.' " And what is the relevance of the source of the manager's invest-
ment? Will a court deem the promoter's cash investment more substantial
than shares based on promotional services or a contract assignment ?124 Final-
ly, 'how should a court assess the promoter's override-his potential share,
not reflected by -his investment, of high property earnings or a profitable re-
sale ?
Since the regulations impose a two-fold standard for association status, the
doubts raised by "representative management" might be less worrisome if a
general partner's death clearly interrupted the venture's existence. But a real
estate syndicate cannot feasibly provide for the sale of a large asset upon the
chance death of one of the promoters. Thus, syndicates usually arrange for
continued existence after a general partner's death.
In spelling out these post-mortem arrangements, the promoter's choice of
language may 'be crucial. If the partnership agreement asserts candidly that
"[I]f any of the General Partners die .... or become insane, the partnership
shall not be deemed to be dissolved. In the event of the death or insanity, all
rights, 'benefits and obligations under this agreement shall pass to the personal
representative of said general manager. ,",.1 the resemblance to corporate
continuity becomes compelling; and, under the Morrissey regulations, only
the vague "representative management" test would separate the partnership
from an association. Not trusting this filmy screen between themselves and
corporate taxation, syndicators 'have sought to devise language that, even as
it disavows continuity, also assures the investors that a general partner's death
is unlikely to affect the venture's life. This sleight-of-hand draftsmanship often
takes the following form:
In the event of the death, retirement, bankruptcy or adjudication of a
General Partner, the Partnership shall be dissolved or terminated. How-
ever, the surviving General Partners, acting unanimously, shall have the
right, but not the obligation, to form a new New York Limited Partner-
ship to engage in the same business as the Partnership, and employing
the assets and name of Partnership .... 120
122. See Driscoll, The Association Problem in Joint Ventures and Limited Partner-
ships, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1067, 1084 (1959); Heard, How To Avoid the
Taxation of Limited Partnerships as Corporations, 6 J. TAxATxoN 298 (1957).
123. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
124. One author suggests that a contribution of services may be far more valuable to
the venture than a capital investment, and cites Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733,
740 (1949). Driscoll, supra note 122, at 1085.
125. Golden Holding Co., Copartnership Notice, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 1959, p. 16, col. 2.
126. Madison-54th Realty Co., Copartnership Notice, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 1959, p. 16,
col 1.
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On its face, a general partner's death terminates the entity; yet the reason-
able expectation is that the remaining general partners will form a successor
firm. Hinging continuity upon the survivors' unanimous consent relies, of
course, on Glensder, which vitalized the distinction between assured continuity
and almost-assured continuity 'by stressing the free choice of the surviving
general partners to continue or not. 7 But an underlying risk lurks in trying
to equate Glensder with the typical real estate syndicate. On its facts, the syn-
dicate partnership more closely resembles the Morrisscy trust than the Glens-
der family group. To pull Glensder's language out of context and to apply it
automatically to all other limited partnerships may be an act of faith; it may
not, however, be an act of wisdom. 8
127. See 46 B.T.A_ at 185.
128. Two years ago, syndicator Louis Glickman obtained a private ruling that Motors
Building Realty Company, a limited partnership of nearly 1200 investors formed to acquire
the General Motors Building leasehold, would not be taxed as an association. Motors Build-
ing Realty Co., Prospectus, June 3, 1958, p. 10. Since the benefits of a private ruling do not
radiate beyond its addressee, Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959), other
syndicates cannot bank upon like favorable treatment. Moreover, rulings relative to the
association status of individual syndicates are not presently obtainable. 108 J. Accom.TAxcy
77 (1959). And the Service is now challenging the taxability of real estate syndicates or-
ganized as general partnerships in three pending cases. White, How To Prevnt Real
Estate Venture Behig Taxed as a Corporation, 12 J. TAjXLrbo. 48 (1960).
The Service has recently issued proposed regulations in another attempt to unmuddy
the association waters. Proposed Treas. Regs. §§ 301.7701-1 to -4, 24 Fed. Reg. 10451-55
(1959). A public hearing to discuss the proposals took place in Washington on February
25, 1960. The National Real Estate Investor, March 1960, p. 23.
The proposals state reminiscently:
An organization will be treated as an Association if the corporate characteristics
are such that the organization more nearly resembles a corporation than a partner-
ship or trust. See Morrissey et al. v. Commissioner (1935) 296 U.S. 344.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, 24 Fed. Reg. 10451 (1959).
Characteristics cited as material in distinguishing an association from a partnership are
most of the old standbys: (1) continuity of life; (2) centralized management (but note:
"in a representative capacity" is omitted) ; (3) limited liability; and (4) free transferability
of interests. But each of these is described in fuller detail than has been done by previous
regulations or the courts.
The Service suggests that it will scrutinize a partnership entity for each of the four
elements. Where these are present in various combinations, the entity will be treated as an
association. The proposed regulations then set forth a number of detailed examples to illus-
trate what elements, separately or in combination, are regarded by the Service as preserv-
ing the partnership or creating association status.
Although the expanded definitions, together with the e.x=amples, may help the syndicate
promoter chart his course between partnership and association, the hoped-for precision and
predictibility has not resulted.
In the first place, the detailed tests, while dispersing some old clouded issues, may have
gathered new ones. For example, the proposals would seem to resolve the uncertainty over
the corporate resemblance of a limited partnership's management, see text following note
121 supra, by characterizing the management of any limited partnership as centralized by
its "very nature." On the other hand, the Service suggests that a limited partnership may
avoid "limited liability" if at least one partner has both personal liability and "substantial
1960]
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THE NEED FOR REGULATION
The much-publicized Nassau Management affair 129 demonstrates the erosive
effect of unsound property selection and inadequate property management
upon investor's expectations.3 0 Organized in 1952 to engage in urban renewal
projects and property management, 13 1 Nassau Management Company later
ventured into syndication. Typical of its syndications was the raising in 1957
of 1,250,000 dollars to purchase the ,Concourse Plaza Hotel in the Bronx.8 2
The investment group formed The Concourse Plaza Company, a limited part-
nership, in which the Nassau promoters were the general partners, with two
assets." But what are substantial assets? Aud when are these measured? At the venture's
formation or during each taxable year thereafter? Even more troublesome is the vagueness
of the test for "continuity of life." Although the Service devotes three paragraphs to ex-
plain continuity, it has done little more than hinge continuity upon whether, under state
law, the general partner's death or withdrawal will "dissolve" the entity. But the state law
for a limited partnership, as an instance, is usually the Uniform Limited Partnership Act ;
and § 20 of the uniform act, speaking to the issue of dissolution, provides that the "retire-
ment, death or insanity of a general partner dissolves the partnership, unless the business
is continued -by the remaining general partners." Is it enough, in order for a limited part-
nership to escape continuity, to provide in its certificate that a general -partner's death shall
cause dissolution, but that the surviving general partners may elect to continue the business.
See the text at note 126 supra for a common example of this language. If the survivors'
election to continue is binding on the limited partners, then, despite the certificate language,
it is difficult to see how dissolution has taken place in any meaningful sense. For dissolution
to occur, the limited partners who do not wish to join the "new" entity should be permitted
to assert a claim against the "old" entity for their proportionate share of the partnership
assets. And at least one recently formed limited-partnership syndicate perhaps in antici-
pation of the proposed regulations has apparently adopted this view by agreeing to pur-
chase at its appraised value the interest of any limited partner who chooses to drop out
when the business is continued after a general partner's death. See 501 Fifth Realty Co.,
Brochure, Nov. 12, 1959, p. 8.
Even if the detailed tests were clearer, the examples given in the proposed Regulations
to suggest what combinations of elements will constitute either an association or partner-
ship cover only a portion of the possible combinations. The examples assert that centralized
management and a modified form of free transferability accompanied by either limited lia-
bility or continuity of life will invoke association treatment. TBut they leave unanswered the
effect of one of the former with one of the latter. Nor do they suggest the effect of con-
tinuity alone, or when it is accompanied by limited liability.
129. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 1, col. 4; id., Jan. 24, 1958, p. 25, col. 1; id., Jan.
25, 1958, p. 40, col. 4; id., Jan. 26, 1958, § 8, p. 1, col. 8; id., Jan. 28, 1958, p. 56, col. 1; id.,
Jan. 29, 1958, p. 5, col. 7; id., Jan. 31, 1958, p. 42, col. 4; id., Feb. 1, 1958, p. 7, col. 2; id,,
Feb. 3, 1958, p. 15, col. 6; id., Feb. 4, 1958, p. 31, col. 3; id., Feb. 5, 1958, p. 18, col. 2; id,,
Feb. 8, 1958, p. 2 1, col. 1 ; id., Feb. 21, 1.958, p. 15, col. 2; id., March 16, 1958, § 1, p. 1, col. 5;
id., June 6, 1958, p. 1, col. 1 ; id., Dec. 17, 1959, p. 20, col. 5.
130. From time to time, observers have voiced alarms about the soundness of syndica-
tion. See, e.g., the statement of Henry Rice, Vice-Pres. of James Felt & Co.: "A potentially
explosive situation has resulted from the activities of a small minority of real estate pro-
moters ... [O]nly continued rise in realty values has prevented marginal syndicators from
collapsing." Realty, Jan. 19, 1960, p. 1, col. 4.
131. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1958, p. 25, col. 1.
132. Id., Jan. 23, 1958, p. 1, col. 4, at 18, col. 4.
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hundred and fifty subscribers as limited partners.13a The syndicate acquired
title to the 'Concourse Plaza, and executed a simultaneous leaseback to a pro-
moter-owned dummy management company. 134 Under the lease arrangement,
the limited partnership was to receive an annual net rental permitting a twelve
per cent distribution to the investors.135 For their reward, the promoters re-
ceived a twenty per cent cost-free participation in The Concourse Plaza Com-
pany, as well as the amount, if any, by which the net operating income of the
hotel exceeded the net rental payment to the partnership. 30 The Concourse
Plaza syndication met with great favor on the part of the investing public, as
did five other Nassau ventures, all but one utilizing the Concourse Plaza lease-
back ,formula.137 By 1957, the Nassau promoters had raised nearly five million
dollars from twelve hundred subscribers. 3 8 In every instance, the only dis-
closures made to prospective investors were contained in crude brochures,
which consisted mainly of sketchy property descriptions and overoptimistic
profit-loss estimates.139
For at least three of the ventures, operating realities did not coincide with
the promoters' expectations. 40 Adverse competitive factors, unprovided-for
capital improvement needs, and the burden of heavy debt-service depressed
the properties while the promoters' ineptitude as hotel managers compounded
their difficulties. In order to continue the promised rental payments, and there-
by allay investor uneasiness, the promoters diverted subscription moneys from
a proposed development project, commingled funds from various syndications,
and failed to pay creditors.' 4 ' Instead of certified financial statements which
would have exposed the impending ruin, the investors received misleading, but
comforting, "status" reports.1 42 Eventually the Nassau empire crumbled, under
the combined assault of tax and mortgage delinquency.
The Nassau debacle teaches the significance of full disclosure tu prospective
investors and regular certified accounts to syndicate participants. The inherent
133. Id., Jan. 24, 1958, p. 25, col. 1; id., Jan. 25, 1958, p. 40, col. 4.
134. Interview With Carl fadonik, Assistant Attorney General, New York State, in
New York City, March 7, 1960.
135. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 1, col. 4, at 13, col. 4. A few favored investors re-
ceived 15%-17% returns. Id., Feb. 1, 1958, p. 7, col. 2.
136. Interview With Carl Madonik, supra note 134; see Hotel Concourse Plaza, Bro-
chure [undated], p. 6.
137. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 1, col. 4, at 18, col. 4.
138. Id., Jan. 23, 1958, p. 118, col. 4.
139. Interview With Carl Madonik, supra note 134. See also Hotel Concourse Plaza,
Brochure [undated].
140. Interview With Carl Mfadonik, Assistant Attorney General, New York State, in
New York City, Nov. 1958.
141. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1958, p. 1, col. 1.
Two officers of Nassau Management pleaded guilty to larceny charges arising out "f
their promoter activities. Id., Dec. 17, 1959, p. 20, col. 5. They subsequently withdrew their
guilty plea and have stated their willingness to face trial. Id., Feb. 10, 1960, p. 32, col. 5.
142. See id., March 16, 1958, § 1, p. 1, col. 5.
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speculativeness of the proposed ventures and the promoters' inexperience in
hotel management should 'have been revealed to the investing public. The glare
of disclosure might have dampened public response, or at least manifested the
potential risks. Perhaps, the promoters themselves would have taken a more
considered view of their prospects, either abandoning the ventures or improv-
ing the management arrangements, had disclosure been forced. Furthermore,
the burden of periodic certified statements might have deterred the commin-
gling of funds, thereby preventing the germs of 'Concourse Plaza from infect-
ing other ventures, as well as alerting the Nassau investors much sooner to
their coming financial difficulties.
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION
Despite its desirability, full disclosure has not been readily available to the
potential syndicate investor. Many solicitations do not supply information of
sufficient scope and materiality upon which a sound investment choice may be
predicated. Yet long-standing federal and state legislation affecting security
offerings would seem to entitle the would-be syndicate participant to better
information than he is now receiving.
The Securities Act of 1933
Federal regulation of newly issued securities received its major impetus with
the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933.148 This legislation is grounded
in the philosophy of full disclosure-supply the prospective investor with the
relevant facts and trust that these will guide him to a sound investment
choice.144 Under the act, the issuer files a registration statement with the
Securities and Exchange Commission containing specified and detailed infor-
mation about himself and the offering. The registration statement, and the
accompanying documents, are reviewed by the SEC's Division of Corporate
Finance for compliance with its standards of accurate and complete disclosure.
Until the Commission's requirements are satisfied, and at least twenty days
have elapsed after the original filing, the securities may not be lawfully sold. 145
In addition, an offering circular, its contents extracted from the registration
143. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1958).
144. See the President's Message, March 29, 1933, contained in H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). It reads in part:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which
might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are
sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which
they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securi-
ties to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and in-
formation, and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be con-
cealed from the buying public.
145. See 25 SEC ANN. REP. 28 (1958).
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statement, must be furnished to the would-be purchaser for his examination
before the security sale can become final.'4 0
In addition to providing the machinery for registration, the SEC also directs
investigations to ferret out Securities Act violations, such as failure to regis-
ter, the making of untrue statements, and the deliberate omitting of material
facts.14 7 Benign infractions, often based upon ignorance or misunderstanding,
are customarily disposed of 'by consultation with the violator followed by his
compliance.' 48 For more serious offenses, the investigatory process may lead
to administrative disciplinary proceedings, the seeking of injunctive relief in
the federal courts, or referral to the Department of Justice for possible crim-
inal prosecution.1 49
146. See Securities Act of 1933, § 5(b) (2), 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c
(b) (1958). See also Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecling the Public Offering of Securi-
ties, 28 Gmo. WAsir. L. Ray. 119, 136, 137 & n.56 (1959).
During the 20 day "waiting" period, offers to sell, but not sales may be made, if within
the bounds of § 10 of the act. See Cohen, supra at 132-37. See generally Lifton, How To
Organize a Successful Syndication, The National Real Estate Investor, March 1960, p. 12
(syndicator's use of "red herring" prospectus during waiting period may depend upon size
of promotion and his "confidence" in the deal).
147. Violations expose the issuer to both civil and criminal sanctions. Civil: Securities
Act of 1933, § 12, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1958), creates a cause of action
in the security purchaser for recovery of the consideration paid less income, or for dam-
ages, against any person offering or selling securities in violation of Securities Act of 1933.
§ 5, 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958), or by means of a misleading prvspe-
tus or oral communication if the mails or instruments of transportation or communicatiun
in interstate commerce are used. See Jung v. K. & D. Mining Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. R'€ .
1 90887 (7th Cir. 1958) (action by investors to recover purchase price of securities). Secu-
rities Act of 1933, § 11, 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958), creates a cause
of action in the security purchaser for damages against persons who may have assisted in
preparing the registration statement caused by untrue statements or material omissions in
the registration statement.
Crhminal: Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958),
makes unlawful the use of "any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails" for the offering or sale of securities unless regis-
tration statement, when required, is in effect for such security. Securities Act of 1933, § 17,
48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1958), states a broad prohibition against the use
of "interstate commerce" for the fraudulent offering or sale of any security. Securities Act
of 1933, § 23, 48 Stat. 87, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1958), forbids any person from
misrepresenting that an SEC registration is equivalent to an SEC approval. Securities Act
of 1933, § 24, 48 Stat 87, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77.x (1958), denominates the maximum
penalties for a criminal violation of the Securities Act--$5,000 fine or 5 years imprisonment
or both.
148. 24 SEC A.x. REP. 176 (1958).
Paul Windels, Jr., SEC Regional Administrator furnished this e.xample: A syndicated
property had, for its sole occupant a lessee whose lease would expire less than a year after
the offering. In preparing his brochure, the promoter must have overlooked the shortness
of the remaining rental term; at least, the brochure did not mention it. The promoter, after
an SEC arranged conference, agreed to revise his offering circular. Many sales, however,
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For the prospective investor, the apparatus of enforcement is meaningful if
it ensures compliance with the statute and gives full and honest disclosure
before his investment funds are committed. Thus, an injunctive decree pro-
hibiting further sales will not aid in salvaging any part of the principal already
invested in a leaky venture. Moreover, most real estate participation units are
presently being sold without any attempt being made by offerors to comply
with the disclosure process contemplated by the Securities Act. For example,
of the 201 limited-partnership real-estate syndicates evidenced by certificates
filed during 1958 and 1959 in the New York County ,Clerk's Office, only 8
followed the SEC channels.Y50
A combination of factors seems to have contributed to this noncompliance.
Included among these are uncertainty as to whether various forms of syndicate
interests are "securities" as defined by the act; the availability, real and
illusory, of statutory exemptions; the apparent aversion of most syndicate pro-
moters to registration; and the SEC's failure to interject itself more positively
into syndication by accommodating its registration process or its enforcement
powers to the unique problems of syndication.
The availability to the syndicate investor of SEC protection hinges pre-
liminarily upon a matter of definition. Does a participation unit in a real estate
syndicate constitute a "security"? Section 2(1) of the Securities Act defines
security as:
.. any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted-
ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certificate, cer-
tificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas
or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a security, or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or war-
rant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.' 5 '
150. The syndicates in this sampling that completed an SEC registration, based on
records in the Washington office of the SEC were:
Name of Syndicate SEC File No.
Astor Associates 13988
Futterman-DuPont Hotel Co. 15148
The Teagen Company 15239
Dexter Horton Realty Co. 15241
Drake Associates 15490
Texmar Realty Company 15541
National Munsey Co. 15663
Montmartre Hotel Co. 15987
Not one of the approximately 100 syndicate offerings seeking $300,000 or less ("small
issue") made a Regulation A filing, see notes 168-69 infra and accompanying text, according
to records in the New York Regional Office of the SEC.
151. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1958).
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Because no explicit reference is made either to "syndicate" or to the usual
forms in which syndicate interests are marketed,152 some syndicate promoters
have been willing to infer that they are beyond the pale of the act.'M It is
doubtful, however, whether their inferences will withstand the combined weight
of legislative intent, judicial construction, and current SEC sentiment.
In formulating the section 2 (1) definition, Congress gave abundant evidence
of its desire to include all the forms of public security offerings, known and
unknown.'54 In 1933, public participation in real estate had already taken the
form of "stock," "debentures," "evidence of indebtedness," "certificate of in-
terest in profit-sharing agreements," and "collateral trust certificates." With
respect to each of these, section 2(1) is explicit.'r 5 But the modern ftrmis of
syndicate enterprise-the public sale of limited and general partnership units
and direct ownership (exclusive of oil, gas, or mineral rights) interests in real
property were unknown a generation ago. Otherwise, it is likely, in view of
the announced broad purpose in the legislative history, that Congress would
have expressly included them.
The judiciary has given generous content to the language of section 2(1).15,
Twice the United States Supreme Court has found an equivalency between
"security" and the public sale of direct interests in real ebtate. In SEC s,. C. .11.
152. Despite the absence of "limited partnership" within the § 2(1) definition of stcu-
rity, theatrical producers have traditionally filed or registered under the Securities Act
when raising money via sales of limited partnership interests. Interview With Paul Win-
dels, Jr., SEC Regional Administrator, in New York City, Nov. 7, 1958; see, e.g., Regu-
lation A filings for The Andersonville Co., No. 24 N.Y.-4911, Sept. 1, 1959; Mira.le
Worker Co., No. 24 N.Y.-4905, Aug. 3, 1959; Fiorello Co., No. 24 N.Y.-484S, May 25,
1959, in the New York office of the SEC. The high risk factor of a Broadway play may
prompt theatrical producers to immunize themselves against the likelihood of a disenchanted
angel seeking his money back-a remedy furnished by § 12 of the Securities Act to an in-
vestor if the issuer fails to comply, without justification, with the registration provisions
of § 5. See note 147 supra.
153. N.Y. Hearings on Real Estate Syndicalion Before Hon. George Franheathalkr,
Nov. 18, 1957, p. 24a, on file in the New York City office of the New York State attorney
general.
154. "[T]he term 'security'... [is defined] in sufficiently broad and general terms so
as to include within that definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial
world fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (1933).
155. As further evidence that public real estate offerings were within Congress' con-
templation, the original statute also made reference to "certificate of interest in property,
tangible or intangible.' Sec. 2(1), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(i)
(1958). In the 1934 amendment to § 2(1), 48 Stat 905 (1934), the term "security" was
expanded to include "certificate of deposit for a security," "fractional undivided interest in
oil, gas, or other mineral rights," and "any interest.., commonly known as a 'security."
Simultaneously, the original category "certificate of interest in property, tangible or in-
tangible' was deleted.
156. See, e.g., SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264, 267 (E.D. Wash. 1940) (Securities
Act of 1933 a "remedial enactment"; security "to be liberally construed").
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Joiner Leasing Corp.,157 defendant, after acquiring a lease upon 4,700 acres of
potentially oil-bearing land, sought to raise development funds by public sub-
scription. The investors received partial assignments of the dominant leasehold
in parcels ranging from tvo and one-half to twenty acres. In addition, Joiner
contracted with each investor to conduct oil explorations upon the dominant
leasehold parcel.
The SEC sought to restrain the defendants from further sales in violation
of both the registration and antifraud provisions of the Securities Act. In
finding for the Commission, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that leasehold interests were "mere" interests in real estate and not sec-
tion 2(1) securities. The crucial fact for the Court was that the defendants
were selling more than "naked leasehold rights"; they were also trading in
the economic inducements of the proposed exploration well. This package
arrangement, the Court 'held, was within the section 2(1) concept of "invest-
ment contract." In committing itself to a liberal construction of section 2 the
Supreme Court declared:
[T]he reach of the [Securities] Act does not stop with the obvious and
commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices.., are also reached
if it be proved as a matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt
in under terms or courses of dealings which established their character
in commerce as "investment contracts," or "as any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security.' ",58
In SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,159 the Court gave further content to the mean-
ing of an "investment contract." Defendant owned large tracts of Florida
citrus acreage. It publicly offered for sale strips of land transferable via war-
ranty deed. In addition, at extra cost, service contracts were available 'by which
the defendant agreed to cultivate the acreage and pay the net profits to the
owner. Most, but not all, purchasers acquired the service contracts.
The Court agreed with the SEC that the defendant should -have registered
the offering, characterizing it as the sale of investment contracts. That the
service contracts were optional, which might have distinguished these facts
from the Jober arrangements, received only passing notice. An investment
contract, according to Howey, is a "scheme, whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or third party." The form of the investment unit,
whether certificates or warranty deeds, is immaterial.
State and lower federal courts have consistently followed this rationale. 1 0
157. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
158. Id. at 351.
159. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
160. See Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959); Jung v. K. & D. Mill-
ing Go., CCH FED. S.c L. REP. ff 90887 (7th Cir. 1958). For a collection of "investment
contract" decisions, see Loss, SEcuiRuns REouLAxoNs 318-20 & nn.37-49 (1951, Supp.
1955, at 150-51).
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A wonderland of promotional schemes have been deemed investment contracts,
subject to federal or state securities control. But not until the 1956 Illinois
decision in Sire Plan Portfolios, Inc. v. Carpentier 16 had a determination
involved syndication. Although the decision's direct impact is limited to the
Illinois Blue Sky Act,1 6 2 federal courts have not 'hesitated to employ state
rulings where, as here, the relevant language of the state statute and the
Securities Act are virtually identical.lea
Under the SIRE Plan syndication, each investor became a cotenant of the
real property, evidenced by a warranty deed describing an undivided fractional
interest. The investors then leased back the property, an apartment house, to
the promoter's wholly-owned affiliate, which undertook the management and
the payment of quarterly rental distributions. Citing Howey, the court ruled
that SIRE Plan units were "investment contracts" within the ambit of the
state's Blue Sky regulation. The opinion stressed the investors' complete de-
pendence upon the promoter's managerial efforts for their rewards, if any, and
the resulting lack of control over the enterprise's expectancies. The SIRE
Planners, as the orange tree vendees in Howey, had made an "investment" in
real property having as an intrinsic feature, and without which the investment
might not have been made, a "contract" for the property's management and
development.
In evolving the concept of an investment contract as a security, therefore, -
the courts have emphasized the investors' dependence upon the promoter or
a third party for profit. The SEC has welcomed this interpretation, and has
embellished it by formulating a pattern of practices tending to demonstrate
promoter, rather than investor, control over an enterprise.' 6" These include
sole investigation and selection of the property by the promoter; implied or
actual guarantee of specified yield; the sale of fractional interests; and cir-
cumstances necessitating complete reliance upon the promoter, such as distance
between property and investor; and the servicing of the property. In summary,
the Commission has declared:
The wider the range of services offered and the more the investor must
rely on the promoter or third party, the clearer it becomes that there is
an investment contract. While there may be circumstances under which
161. 8 Ill. App. 2d 354, 132 N.E.2d 78 (1956).
162. ILL. Rrv. STAT. ch. 121Y, § 1372(A) (1957).
163. See, e.g., SECv. V. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946), where the Supreme
Court relied on state "Blue Sky" decisions to determine the meaning of "investment con-
tract" in the Securities Act.
The Florida attorney general expressed his opinion that the solicitation of limited part-
ners met the "securities" test of his state's Blue Sky Law. Although the wording of the
Florida statute was slightly distinguishable from its Securities Act counterpart, the attor-
ney general considered the "investment contract" language of the Hmwy, case a sufficient
analogy. 2 BLUE Sx:Y L. Rin,. 1 70388.
164. See SEC Sec. Act Release No. 3892, Jan. 31, 1958. Although the SEC's opinion
quoted therein is directed to the sale of fractional interests in mortgages or deeds of trusts,
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one or more of these elements are present without constituting an invest-
ment contract, it is the position of the Commission that each of them has
a 'bearing on whether the investor is relying "solely on the efforts of the
promoter or third party" to use the investor's money and through these
efforts to return a profit to the investor-the essential test of an invest-
ment contract. 165
Whatever "investment contract" may have meant to the 73d Congress, judi-
cial and administrative constructions have made the term capable of encom-
passing nearly all syndicate offerings,' 66 since promoter control and investor
dependency are distinctive features of the real estate syndicate, regardless of
its organizational format.
Even though a syndicate offering is a security under section 2(1), an is-
suer may 'be exempted from registration by other provisions of the act. In an
effort to reduce the workload of the SEC, Congress exempted from registra-
tion various securities and transactions which involved minimal risks to the
prospective investor or which could be readily policed at the state or local
level.167 For example, the Commission was authorized to exempt from its
registration procedure "small" issues, presently defined as any issue of securi-
ties in the principal amount of 300,000 dollars or less which is marketed in
one calendar year.16 8 The "small" issue, however, does not entirely escape the
preoffer scrutiny of the SEC, for it is subject to the filing requirements of
Regulation A, a stripped-down version of a full registration.6 0 Two exemp-
the "investment contract" criteria set forth in the opinion seem useful in determining whether
a participation unit in a real estate syndicate will be deemed a § 2(1) security.
165. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 3892, Jan. 31, 1958, reprinted in 'CCH FIM. Sc. L.
ZEp. ff 76559.
166. "Whether they [real estate syndicates] take the form of a Massachusetts or other
type of trust, a limited or general partnership, a joint venture, a fractionalized title or
mortgage, or anything else that the ingenuity of the lawyer or the promoter may devise, it
is required by the Securities Act of 1933 that the interests which are sold or even offered
for the purpose of raising money be registered." Remarks of Paul Windels, Jr., SEC Re-
gional Administrator, to the Association of Real Estate Syndicators, Inc., Feb. 6, 1958,
New York City.
For judicial construction, see notes 156-64 supra and accompanying text.
167. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3a, 4, 48 Stat. 75, 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d
(1958).
168. 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1958); see 17 C.F.R. §§
230.251-.262 (Supp. 1959).
A syndicator may promote any number of real estate ventures within a year without los-
ing the small issues exemption for each issue not exceeding $300,000. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.-
254(d) (5) (Supp. 1959).
169. Under Regulation A procedure, the issuer files on form 1-A with an SEC Regional
Office for the region in which the issuer's principal business operations are conducted at
least ten days prior to the date of issue. 17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (Supp. 1959) ; SEC Sec. Act
Release No. 3663, July 23, 1956. Query: If the syndicated property is located in Region
A, and owned by a limited partnership organized in Region B, where should the filing take
place? If the offering exceeds $50,000 each investor must be given prior to purchase an
[Vol. 69: 725
REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION
tions which make registration in any form unnecessary provide the basis upon
which syndicate promoters have regularly avoided full disclosure under the
act-section 3(a) (11) exempting "intrastate" transactions and section 4(1)
exempting private offerings.
To qualify as an exempt intrastate offering, the issue must be offered and
sold only to residents of the same state or territory in which the issuer is
resident and doing business170 Offers or sales to nonresidents extinguish the
exemption retroactively to the date when the issue was first offered publicly.'-,
A solicitation by the mails, newspapers, or other interstate media, however,
will not cause the loss of 3 (a) (11) immunity in the absence of other factors,'- 2
offering circular containing the information shown at schedule I of form 1-A. 17 C.F.R §§
230256-.257 (Supp. 1959).
Form 1-A appears in 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 7325-27. For a comparison with form
S-1, the registration statement used by a nonexempt real estate syndicate in a Securities
Act § 5 registration, see 1 CCH FED. S. L. REP. l 7121-29. For a further discussion of
form S-1, see text at notes 206-10 infra.
For discussions of Regulation A, see generally Glavin & Purcell, Securities Offerings
and Regulation A-Requirements and Risks, 13 Bus. LAw. 303 (1958) ; Loss, SscuruTims
REGuLA nON 380-87 (1951) ; Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of
Securities, 28 Go. WASH. L. REv. 119, 148 n.72 (1959).
170. 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1958):
Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subclapter Shall
not apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(11) Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons
resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a
person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and
doing business within, such State or Territory.
For a discussion of § 3(a) (11), see McCauley, Intrastate Securities Transactions Under-
the Federal Securities Act, 107 U. PA. L. R~v. 937 (1959).
171. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 1459, May 29, 1937, reprinted in 1 CCH Fw. SEc.
L. REP. 1 2245.25; Petersen Engine Co., 2 S.E.C. 893, 903 (1937) (sale by New York cor-
poration to one New Jersey resident violated § 3 (a) (11) exemption).
In 1954, § 3(a) (11) was amended to subject offers, as well as sales, to the single-state
requirement. See S. REP. No. 1036, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1954).
The Commissioner construes residence to mean domicile in the conflicts-of-law sense.
Loss, SEcua'rrms REGULATIoN 379 n.252 (1951) ; see S. 'Fx. No. 1036, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
13 (1954).
172. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 1459, May 29, 1937, reprinted in I CCH Fm. SEc. L
REP. ff 224525:
... [T]he so-called "intrastate exemption" is not in any way dependent upon
absence of use of the mails or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce in the distribution . . . Securities thus exempt may without
registration be offered and sold through the mails, may be made the subject of general
newspaper advertisement (provided the advertisement is appropriately limited to in-
dicate that offers to purchase are solicited only from, and sales will be made only to,
residents of the particular state involved), and may even be delivered in interstate
commerce to the purchasers, if such purchasers, though resident, are temporarily out
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provided that the appeal is addressed exclusively to residents of the issuing
state.
The intrastate exemption has been highly useful to real estate syndicators.
Quite commonly, promoters have been able to solicit and raise all of the funds
needed, often amounting to several hundred thousand dollars, within the
boundaries of a single jurisdiction. More than sixty per cent of the certificates
of limited partnership filed during 1958 by real estate syndicators in the New
York County Clerk's Office were executed entirely 'by professed New York
State residents; the largest offering exceeded two million dollars." 3 By design,
the nonresident investor is assiduously shunned, and assuming that section 3
(a) (11 ) is not otherwise overstepped, the promoter avoids federal registration.
To the extent that state control of the intrastate transaction effectively replaces
federal nonsurveillance, the interests of an investor may yet be protected. But
the range and vitality of state Blue Sky activities vary widely. Among the
state statutes, one of the skimpiest in terms of protection afforded to the in-
vestor has been New York's Martin Act, which presently lacks any disclosure
requirement other than identification of the issuer.1 4 This is particularly un-
settling in view of New York's status as the center of syndicate activity. Thus,
the coalescing of section 3(a) (11) and a weak Blue Sky Law has entirely
deprived significant numbers of syndicate investors of the -benefits of dis-
closure.
of the state or should direct delivery to some non-resident agent or custodian....
Exemption . . . , if . . . available, removes the securities from the operation of all
provisions of the Act except those of Sections 12(2) [civil liability for sale of security
by use of any interstate means or instruments and making untrue statement of ma-
terial fact or omitting a material fact], 17 [employing instruments of interstate coin-
merce for fraudulent transactions].
173. Every signer in 35 of 55 limited partnership certificates filed in the New York
County Clerk's Office during 1958 used a New York state address. Of these, Newark Center
Bldg. Co., filed May 23, 1958, had the largest capitalization; 307 limited partners invested
$2,300,000 to acquire a leasehold in Newark, New Jersey.
Syndicate Investment No. of Ventures-New York
(Dollars) No. of Ventures State Addresses Only






over $2,000,000 2 1
Four of the ventures included in the table set forth in the text at 733 mtpra did not list
their investors in the original limited partnership certificates.
See also, for example, seven block ads inviting syndicate investment. N.Y. Times, Sept.
20, 1959, § 8, p. 6, col. 4; id. at 9, col. 3; id. at 11, col. 1 ; id. at 15, cols. 5, 6-7, 8; id. § 3, 'p.
6, col. 1 (five are addressed to New York State residents only).
174. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-59; see text at notes 218-24, 235 infra.
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Promoter reliance upon section 3(a) (11) as a basis for exemption may,
however, be misplaced. For example, the recital in a limited partnership cer-
tificate that the issuers and subscribers all reside in one state would not suf-
fice to sustain the intrastate exemption were it shown that a syndicate interest
had been offered for sale to a nonresident; that the subscriber of record is act-
ing in a nonresident's behalf;175 or that the recital of residence is factually
unsupportable.176 Promoters seeking to insulate themselves from federal regis-
tration via section 3(a) (11) customarily obtain an affidavit of residence and
nonagency from the prospective subscriber ;17 whether this will preserve the
exemption in the event of a subscriber's deliberate misstatement is not alto-
gether clear."78 Furthermore, some promoters seem unaware that the require-
ment of one hundred per cent nondiversity is literally construed by the Com-
175. See SEC v. Hillsborough Investment Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86, 88 (D.N.H. 1938)
(for intrastate exemption to be available, securities must be in hands of resident investors
upon completion of ultimate distribution); SEC Litigation Release No. 1549, Dec. 18,
1959 (issuers indicted and convicted for failure to register; dummies and nominees used
to create appearance of intrastate transaction).
176. The use of a temporary address would not make the person a resident. TuomAs,
FEDE.A SEcumarr-s Acr HANDBOOK 23, 28 n.1 (1959).
177. Subscribers to Thirty-Four Associates signed an affidavit containing the follow-
ing:
1. This affidavit is being made by deponent for the purpose of inducing Thirty-
Four Associates, a New York Limited Partnership, having its principal office at
521 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, to permit my subscription for, and pur-
chase of, an interest therein as a Limited Partner.
2. I am an adult resident of, and domiciled in, the State of New York. I am
subscribing for and purchasing the aforesaid interest in Thirty-Four Associates on
my own behalf and for my own beneficial interest, and not as the agent for or rep-
resentative of any other person, and without any intention to resell, assign, or other-
wise transfer such interest to any person who is not a resident of and domiciled in
the State of New York.
Affidavit on file in Yale Law Library.
For a further safeguard against a resident investor buying in order to resell to a nvn-
resident, see 501 Fifth Realty Co., Copartnership Notice, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1959, p. 17,
col. 7 ("for one year ... no Limited Partnership unit assignable %ithout written consent
of any one of the General Partners").
178. Although the absence of wilfulness would bar the criminal penalties of § 24, see
Loss, SEcuimIs REGULATION 1109 (1951), it is uncertain whether the issuer would also
avoid the civil sanctions of §§ 12(1) and 20(b) (SEC given power to enjoin Securities
Act violations). Professor Loss does not believe that Congress expected the issuer to insure
each investor's residence, provided he makes due inquiry. Id. at 379 n.252. A second com-
mentator, however, is less sanguine. He advises an issuer relying on § 3(a) (11) to secure
some collateral evidence--e.g., a voter's certificate of registration, in addition to the offeree's
self-serving statement THOMAs, FmaRAL SEcuairis Acr HANDBooK 23 (1959). Query:
Although he might use this technique before completing a sale, how can a promoter, in
advance of his offer to sell, feasibly seek such assurance from every offeree? A court might
find a way around this barrier by imposing a higher level of inquiry after the offer and
before the sale.
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mission. With surprising frequency, the public records disclose syndications
containing a sprinkling of nonresident participants where it was probable,
from the fact of nonregistration, that a section 3 (a) (11) exemption was con-
templated. 17 No basis exists for an expectation that a slight deviation, made
with knowledge, from the single residence requirement will be overlooked as
de minimis.
When issuer and investors reside in one state, but the real property upon
which the enterprise feeds is located elsewhere, the 3 (a) (11) exemption may
be unavailable. Section 3 (a) (11) requires that the issuer reside and conduct
business within a single state. The limits of "doing business" in this phrase
are muddled.'8 0 Syndicators maintain that the location of the entity's home
office, particularly if the financial and business records are kept therein, meets
the "doing business" test.'8 ' On the other hand, an SEC representative has
announced informally that the Commission will equate "doing business" in the
syndication sense with the operation of the real property, and that the situs of
the real property is the controlling factor.182
1.79. Of the twenty ventures having diversity of investor residence, see note 173 supra,
the promoters in eleven may have contemplated a § 4(1) private offering exemption. 48
Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958) ; see text at notes 259-68 infra. In each
of the other nine, where the investor count makes it likely that the exemption-seeking pro-
moter did not contemplate a private offering the number of non-New Yorkers did not ex-
ceed six; four of the ventures had only one nonresident.
180. One writer, without citing his authority, has stated that the SEC's view "over the
years is that the issuer must conduct its principal business within the state [of issuel."
McCauley, Intrastate Securities Transactions Under the Federal Securities Act, 107 U.
PA. L. REv. 937, 950 (1959). The SEC has not formalized this view, although Commission
officials have recently paid it lipservice, see note 257 in ra, and SEC v. Truckee Showboat,
Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957), discussed in note 181 in!ra, suggests a more forth-
right approach.
181. For the view that the "doing business" test is not one of limitation, see Loss,
SECURITIEs REGULATION (Supp. 1955, at 163 n.252) :
So far as concerns the requirement that the issuer also be "doing business" with-
in the state, it is understood to be the administrative construction that the issuer's
business need not be confined to the one state ... that even the main part of the
issuer's business may be conducted in another state; but that the issuer must be doing
some business in the state of the offering other than selling the securities in question.
In 1957, the SEC sought an injunction against Truckee Showboat, Inc., a California
corporation, to prevent the sale of non-registered corporate securities to California resi-
dents. The proceeds were earmarked for the purchase and operation of the El Cortez Hotel
in Las Vegas, Nevada. The defendant claimed relief from registration upon the "intrastate
exemption" of § 3(a) (11). The court ruled that the planned ownership and operation of
the Nevada hotel destroyed the "intrastate exemption." During the litigation, however, the
defendant withdrew its offering and the motion for injunction was denied since the issue
had become moot. SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
182. Remarks of Paul Windels, 'Jr., SEC Regional Administrator, to Realty Invest-
ment Syndicators Ass'n, New York City, Feb. 6, 1958. ,Mr. Windels intimates that even if
the property is located where the issuer and investors reside, the 3(a) (11) exemption may
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The intrastate exemption should be available, if at all, only when the entire
enterprise, from the initial securities offering through the venture's operation,
can be supervised by the officialdom of a single state. Otherwise, the dilution
of control among the authorities of two or more states, with its attendant
delays, customary differences, and jurisdictional barriers may water down the
effectiveness with which the investor's interests are protected. The desired
objective of unitary control, assuming that the controlling state has an ade-
quate program for investor protection, is unattainable for the regulation of
a syndicate emanating from state A based upon real estate situate in state B.
Proceedings affecting the property, such as an action to enjoin its disposition
or the appointment of a receiver, would necessarily originate in state B, where-
as in personam proceedings directed to the promoter's activities, such as failure
to register the syndicate offering, misrepresentation, or breach of managerial
agreement, would ordinarily be instituted in state A. Any attempt by the Blue
Sky officials of state A to investigate or restrain the property's operation
would, in most instances, require the active cooperation of state B personnel.
Even the initial process of registration, when it is predicated upon full and
honest disclosure, would become more fruitful if the officials of state A were
able to view, or had some familiarity with, the property and its surroundings.
In contrast, the SEC, with its nationwide network of offices and ready access
to the facilities of a United States Attorney and the federal judiciary, is
equipped to transcend state lines. Thus it would seem that investor protection
is more effectively maximized by denying the section 3(a) (11) exemption
unless the syndicate participants and the real property are located within a
single state.
A Securities Act filing or registration may be avoided by bringing the trans-
action within section 4(1), which exempts "transactions by an issuer not in-
volving any public offering."'183 The statute does not define "public offering,"
nor does it establish a quantitative test in terms of the number of offerees in
the fashion of many state Blue Sky Laws.184 In 1934, the SEC General Coun-
sel ventured that "under ordinary circumstances an offering to not more than
approximately twenty-five persons ... presumably does not involve a public
offering."'1 5 Despite his further qualification that the number of offerees was
be lost if the building is leased to an out-of-state concern. It is difficult to detect any read-
ing of the statute that would support this view.
183. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(1), 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1958).
See generally Israels, Some Commercial Ov'ertones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L Rv.
851 (1959) ; Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering: Hacards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L REv.
869 (1959) ; Loss, SEcualX=s RE ULATIOx 394-403 (1951) ; Williams, Exem pted Trans-
actions under Section 4(1), 15 Bus. LAw. 138 (1959) ; Cohen, Federal Legislation Affect-
ing the Puzblic Offering of Securities, 28 GmO. VAsH. L. REv. 119, 141-44 n.64 (1959).
184. For a discussion of the private offering counterpart of state Blue Sky statutes,
see Loss & Cow=rr, BLuE SKY LAw 368-74 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Loss & Covar].
185. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 285, Jan. 24, 1935, reprinted in SEC, CmPLAT1.O.
oF RELEAsEs UNDER SEcuRIrms Acr oF 1933, at 87 (1936).
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not an exclusive determinant, and the SEC's refusal to issue an administra-
tive ruling, the exempt status of an offering to twenty-five persons or less has
become a convenient, if not entirely dependable, rule of thumb.180
Because this quantitative "test" stresses the number of off erees, rather than
ultimate investors, its utility is limited. The ,Commission has evidentiary dif-
ficulties in establishing that an offer to sell, in contrast with an actual sale,
has been made, while the syndicator's activities may be unduly hampered, since
t-wenty-five offers may result in only a handful of sales. Accordingly, syndicate
managers have preferred to view the rule of twenty-five not as a ceiling upon
the availability of the private-offering exemption, 'but as a crossover point at
which various other factors 'become relevant. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 81
the Supreme Court attempted to summarize these other factors by focusing
its inquiry upon "the need of the offerees (whether few or many) for the
protection afforded by registration."' 88 If a need for protection exists, the
offering is public. Whether a need exists would depend upon both the ex-
pertise of the offerees and their alternative means of access to the information
which registration would disclose. Lower federal courts, in concluding that in
the absence of such need an offering was private, have emphasized the pre-
vious business relationship between the -parties and the "sophisticated discern-
ment" with which the purchasers entered into the transaction.'80
In its application to the real estate syndicate, section 4(1) should be handled
gingerly. The venture characterized by an open and indiscriminate appeal for
investor funds is clearly a public offering,190 regardless of the ultimate number
of participants. Less heralded, however, are the bulk of syndications, where
the methods of solicitation manifest many traits common to private offerings.
These include the extensive use of person-to-person solicitation, the absence
of an underwriting agreement, the disdain of mass advertising media. Occa-
sionally, the promoter conducts no formal solicitation; word-of-mouth rumors
that the syndication is being organized may result in its oversubscription.
Nevertheless, since the Securities Act is founded upon investor need, the bene-
fit to the promoter of section 4(1) should not inure automatically because of
his promotional methods. Instead, the focus must remain upon the identity
and the information sources of the offeree.
186. See Kroll, The Why and How of Real Estate Syndications: Regulation Aspects,
Prac. Law., March 1959, p. 70, at 73.
187. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
188. Id. at 127.
189. See Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th Cir. 1959) ("closely knit
arrangement among friends and acquaintances . . . .All of the purchasers apparently
entered into the transaction with sophisticated discernment") ; Campbell v. Degenther, 97
F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (sale of securities to 32 persons known to issuer "through
mutual business associates" held a private sale).
1.90. See block ad in N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1959, § 8, p. 14, cols. 6-7; N.Y. Times, June
29, 1958, § 10 (reprint of 'Motors 'Building Realty Co., Prospectus, June 3, 1958).
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In determining the availability of section 4(1) shelter the desirability of
further straining the Commission's facilities 191 in order to regulate syndicates
of relatively few investors must be explored. Any argument addressed to the
practical difficulties of regulation ordinarily deserves a respectful audience, but
its advocacy must reflect a balancing of the marginal cost of added enforce-
ment energy against the risks of nonenforcement. The nation's stake in the
integrity of the syndication process cannot be measured solely by the actual
number of investors in any single transaction. One of the tenets of a solvent
economy is that its real estate wealth be operated and financed upon a sound
and honest footing, sustained -by a high level of public confidence. History
shows that the isolated failure of a well-known real estate venture may have a
depressing effect on the national economy. Because syndication is increasingly
affecting the acquisition and development of the nation's real estate resources,
and particularly major commercial and multifamily residential parcels, strong
justification exists for public scrutiny of its operation. Weighing the premium
for increased regulation of the syndicate offering against social desirability
restores the practical, as well as the conceptual, balance in favor of section
4(1) limitation.
The prophylactic intent of the Securities Act is further diluted by infirmi-
ties in its administration. To the extent that its regulations are unenforced, or
are applied by unskilled personnel, or are not relevant to the unique problems
of real estate offerings, the investor's reliance upon the administrative process
to guarantee full disclosure is misplaced. Similarly, compliance with the regu-
lations may unduly burden the syndication process so as to encourage non-
compliance by the promoter or dampen his enterpreneurial initiative.
To date, the syndicate promoter has tended to resolve the ambiguities of
the Securities Act against compliance with its disclosure requirements. Fore-
most among the factors affecting his decision is the practical difficulty of re-
solving the business demand for rapid action with the inherent delays of the
compliance process. Registration takes time; and in the context of real estate
transactions, time of performance is often crucial. The preliminary negotiations
for the transfer of real property interests may hinge upon the parties' agree-
ment as to a dosing date; and after the contract is negotiated, the vendee
ordinarily must perform within a relatively short period.102 Furthermore, a
191. See 25 SEC A~x. REP. 1, 4 (1959).
192. Interview With Louis J. Glickman, New York Syndicator, in New York City,
Nov. 27, 1959; Interview With Albert Mintzer, Founder, The SIRE Plan, Inc., in New
York City, Oct. 25, 1958.
Syndicators sometimes bargain for a lengthy performance period. See Madison-54th
Realty Co., Offering Circular [undated], p. 1 (100 days) ; The Teagen Co., Prospectus,
Aug. 24, 1959, p. 8 (7 months, 28 days). And the seller may agree prospectively to post-
pone the closing date if the vendee makes an additional cash deposit for each extension. See
Garment Capitol Associates, Prospectus, Feb. 13, 1957, p. 7 (additional $250,000 deposit for
each of two one-month adjournments).
Time is less pressing if the promoter already owns or has an interest in the property
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purchaser usually forfeits a substantial deposit for failure to perform 103 on the
closing date. If he expects to syndicate the venture, and is dependent upon
investors' funds to fulfill his contractual obligations, the speed with which the
offering can be launched is crucial. By contrast, the decision of an industrial
concern to launch a securities issue is seldom subservient to the same demands
of time.
'When viewed against the urgency of the syndicate promoter's needs, the
registration process consumes too much time. In the year ending June 30,
1959, the median Securities Act registration of all issues required twenty-eight
days from the date of filing. 1 4 But often syndicate promoters may not fare
even this well. 195 The prolonged handling of syndicate offerings results from
the unfamiliarity of many promoters, or their attorneys, with SEC procedure,
the Commission's own inexperience with syndicate venture 100 and its failure
to change gears presently adjusted for industrial offerings. 07 To the time
spent before the SEC, however, must 'be added the preliminary period during
which the promoter prepares his first submission. The promoter or his experts
must abstract financial records, gather the opinions of tax 10s and legal coun-
that he plans to syndicate. See, e.g., Stanbalt Realty Co., Brochure, Dec. 16, 1957, pp. 5-6;
Hotel Taft Associates, Prospectus, Jan. 2, 1958, pp. 6, 8.
193. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
194. 25 SEC ANN. REP. 28 (1959). In the 1958 and 1957 fiscal years, the medians were
24 days and 23 days respectively. Ibid.
195. Statement of Marvin Kratter to Students of Yale Law School, Jan. 13, 1960; In-
terview With Edward M. Cowett, in New York City, Feb. 12, 1960.
An examination of the SEC files made by the author revealed that the median span for
seven of the eight syndications listed in note 150 supra to complete their registrations from
initial filing to effective date, was 50 days.
196. SEC records reveal that in the two years ending June 30, 1959, only 18 real estate
syndicates filed registration statements. During this interval, there were 2139 filings. See
25 SEC ANN. REP. 29 (1959) ; 24 SEC ANN. REP. 33 (1958). In its 1959 Report, the
Commission attributed the increased median interval between filing and effective date to
"the substantial increase in the number of registration statements filed," a large number of
which related to new or unseasoned ventures which required relatively more time and effort
in making an appropriate review." 25 SEC ,ANN. REP. 28 (1959).
197. See text at notes 206-09 infra.
198. Tax opinions generally accompany a registration of an unincorporated association
and are then extracted in the prospectus. The following is a typical prospectus digest:
2. Tax Status of Associates and the Joint Ventures. Stevenson, Paul, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison, 1614 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., tax counsel, has
furnished Associates with an opinion that the members of Associates and of the joint
ventures to be formed under the Participating Agreements will qualify as partners
for Federal income tax purposes. Therefore, the individual members of Associates
and each participant will be taxed on his distributive share of the net income, but the
net incomes of Associates and the joint ventures will not be taxable as such.
Such opinion notes that the Treasury Regulations contain provisions under which
partnerships or joint ventures may be taxed on their net income in the same manner
as corporations and the members thereof may be taxed as shareholders. The opinion,
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sel, draft the organization instruments, and prepare the registration statement
and prospectus. 199 Thus, compliance with SEC registration requirements may
consume two to three months.2 0 Unless compliance time is measurably re-
duced, promoters confronted with short-term deadlines for contract perform-
ance will persist in Securities Act avoidance. While a more energetic program
of enforcement by the Commission could force compliance, such action would
doubtless have the added result of reducing real estate syndications.
The registration statement 201 is the crucial document in the registration
process. Its contents form the basis for the Commission's review and, when
incorporated in the prospectus,202 the grist for the prospective investor's anal-
ysis. The Securities Act provides, generally, for the information and docu-
ments that the registration statement for domestic corporations shall con-
tain.203
In a number of instances, forms have been tailored to suit the needs of
specialty issuers.2 4 For example, exploratory mining corporations, oil or gas
interests, developmental companies receive particularized treatment.20
Form S-1 is the ready-made registration instrument for most commercial
and industrial offerings 206 and, because the SEC has not yet sought to dis-
tinguish it, the real estate syndicate registers with this form. An analysis of
Form S-1 207 suggests that its coverage includes much that has only peripheral
importance to the real estate syndicate,2 08 and at the same time, omits, or
however, concludes that Associates and the joint ventures involved herein do not fall
within the said provisions, and therefore should not be taxable as corporations.
Dyckman Hotel Associates, Prospectus, Jan. 27, 1959, p. 8.
199. See text at note 201 infra.
200. Interview With J. M,. Tenney, in New York City, Nov. 27, 1959; Interview With
Louis Glickman, in New York City, Nov. 27, 1959.
201. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 6-8, 48 Stat. 78-79, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f-h
(1958).
202. See Securities Act of 1933, § 10, 48 Stat. 81 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77j
(1958).
203. Securities Act of 1933, § 7, 48 Stat. 78, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1958) ; 48 Stat. 88
(1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1958) (Schedule A).
204. For the registration statement forms in current use, see 1 CCH FED. Smc. L REP.
Iff 6601-7372. Special forms are available for fifteen classes of securities. Ibid. In some in-
stances, the use of a special form, where it applies, is mandatory. Corstlare 17 CF.R. §
239.17 (1949), with 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (1949).
205. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (Supp. 1959) ; form S-3 and instructions are reproduced in
1 CCH FED. SEa L- RP. 11 7151, 7157 to 7160-3.
17 C.F.R. § 239.17 (Supp. 1959) ; form S-10 and instructions are reproduced in 1 CCH
FED. SEc. L. RP. 111 7201-13.
206. Loss, Szcunns RmuoATIoN 206 (1951).
207. Form S-1, together with general instructions for its use, are reprinted in 1 CCH
FED. SEc L. RP. ff I 7121-28.
208. The following is a copy of the Cross Reference Sheet included in a registration
statement that a proposed real estate syndicate (general partnership) filed on form S-I. The
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understresses, matters of great relevance.20 9 An examination of prospectuses
that have passed SEC scrutiny, however, suggests that the Commission is
Cross Reference Sheet shows the page numbers in the prospectus for each item required
by 17 C.F.R. § 230.404(c) (1949).
N. A. BUILDING AssocIATEs
Cross Reference Sheet Pursuant to Rule 404(c)
Form S-I Prospectus
Item Number Page
1, Distribution Spread ............................................. Cover
2. Plan of Distribution ............................................. 4
3. Use of Proceeds to Registrant ................................... 3
4. Sales Otherwise Than for Cash .................................. *
5. Capital Structure .............................................. *
6. Summary of Earnings ........................................... 14
7. Organization of Registrant ...................................... 3,9
8. Parents of Registrant ........................................... *
9. Description of Business ....................................... 3-4,6-9
10. Description of Property ......................................... 5-6
11. Organization Within 5 Years .................................... 3-4
12. Pending Legal Proceedings ...................................... *
13. Capital Stock Being Registered .................................. *
14. Long-Term Debt Being Registered ...............................
15. Other Securities Being Registered ................................ 9
16. Directors and Executive Officers ................................. *
17. Remuneration of Directors and Officers .......................... *
18. Options to Purchase Securities ................................... *
19. Principal Holders of Securities .................................. *
20. Interest of Management and Others in Certain Transactions ....... 3-4
*Omitted as negative or inapplicable
To further illustrate the difficulties that a real estate syndicator, inexperienced in the
ways of the SEC, might face when trying to complete a registration on form S-1, examine
the partial instruction furnished by the Commission for Item 10, Description of Property:
State briefly the location and general character of the principal plants, mines and
other materially important physical properties of the registrant and its subsidiaries.
.. What is required is information essential to an investor's appraisal of the secu-
rities being registered. Such information should be furnished as will reasonably in-
form investors as to the suitability, adequacy, productive capacity and extent of utili-
zation of the facilities used in the enterprise. Detailed descriptions of the physical
characteristics of individual properties or legal descriptions by metes and 'bounds are
,not required and should not be given.
1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 7123.
Real estate syndicators have complained to the SEC about the unsuitability of form S-1.
Remarks of Paul Windels, Jr., SEC Regional Administrator, to Realty Investment Syn-
dicators' Ass'n, New York City, Feb. 8, 1958.
209. Contrast the disclosure required by form S-1 with that required by the New York
Legislature in N.Y.A.I. No. 2851, 1959 Sess. (Feb. 3, 1959), a syndicate control measure
enacted in 1959 and vetoed by the -Governor. See notes 233, 236 infra. Compare also SEC
form S-10 for the registration of oil or gas interests, in I CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 1111 7203-
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developing a format of disclosure that is meaningful for syndication. Signifi-
cantly, the finished product bears only fleeting resemblance to Form S-1.21'
Perhaps the adaptation of a registration form shaped especially for the real
estate syndicate would have the two-fold benefit of making dearer the Com-
mission's demands and reassuring the wary promoter that the SEC is mak-
ing adjustment to syndication's peculiar needs.
Blue Sky Laws
In addition to the federal securities act, a syndicate promotion may 'be sub-
ject to control by each of the states touched by its operations. -3" Under most
Blue Sky Laws, as under the Securities Act, "security" has acquired sufficient-
ly broad content to include participations in syndicate ventures.21 2 If the syn-
dicate offering complies with Securities Act disclosure, state regulation may
duplicate and, in many instances, extend investor protection. But if federal
regulation is ineffectual or unavailing, the prospective syndicate investor must
rely primarily upon controls at the state level.
Although to categorize the Blue Sky laws invites oversimplification, three
distinctive patterns of regulation emerge: (1) antifraud; (2) security regis-
tration; and (3) broker-dealer registration.213
Blue Sky laws designed to prevent or punish fraudulent securities practices
were the earliest statutory form of investor 'protection.2 14 Today, however,
210. See, e.g., The Teagen Co., Prospectus, Aug. 24, 1959; National Munsey Co., Pro-
spectus, Nov. 20, 1959; Dyckman Hotel Associates, Prospectus, Jan. 27, 1959.
211. Excepting Delaware and Nevada, every state regulates the public offering of
securities. 1 BLuE SKY L. RE. ff 501.
Although the Delaware Code of 1953 omitted his previously expressed authority, the
Chancellor's far-reaching general equity powers may enable him to enjoin fraudulent secu-
rities dealings. 1 id. f 1110L
212. State courts and law officers in applying the Blue Sky Laws have adopted the rule
of broad construction to "give effect to remedial legislation." See McElfresh v. State, 9 So.
2d 277 (Fla. 1942); State v. Whiteaker, 118 Ore. 656, 247 Pac. 1077 (1926) (partnership
interest a security); People v. Hoshor, 92 Cal. App. 2d. 250, 206 P.2d 882 (Dist. Ct. App.
1949) (limited partnership a security) ; Fla. Att'y Gen. Opinion, 2 BLUTE Sry L REP. fl
70388 (1958) (solicitation of limited partners to participate in profit-sharing agreement
within definition of securities in Florida Securities Law) ; Foreman v. Holsman, 2 BLUE
Sxy L. RFP. ff 70330 (Ill 1956) (beneficial interest in real estate trust formed to construct
and operate apartment building held a security, and not an interest in real estate) ; Brown
v. Cole, 155 Te. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956) (parties held not to have enjoyed joint con-
trol; hence, not exempt joint venture) ; La. Att'y Gen. Opinion, 1 BLuE SKY L RzP. 1
1631.041 (1947).
But see Mlic. STAT. ANN. § 19.745(j) (1959) (exempting "joint adventures" defined
as voluntary association of not more than 25 individuals) ; Grabendike v. Adix, 335 Mich.
128, 55 N.W.2d 761 (1952) (sale of fractional interests in oil well drilling project held
"joint adventure").
213. For a state-by-state rundown, including statutory citations, see Loss & Cowmr
39-42.
214. At least forty jurisdictions now have laws creating civil or criminal remedies for
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they serve chiefly as a supplement to state registration requirements.216 As
an exception to the prevailing pattern, New York 216 and New Jersey "17 have
stressed the antifraud provisions, as the primary safeguard to the securities in-
vestor. Because of the present importance of syndication in the Metropolitan
New York area, this aberration has been of some consequence ito the syndicate
participant. The New York Blue Sky Law, or "Martin Act," empowers the
attorney general to investigate, subpoena witnesses and documents in support
of investigation, institute injunction proceedings, or apply for receivers in con-
nection with any fraudulent practice arising out of the "issuance, exchange,
purchase, sale, promotion, negotiation, advertisement or distribution" of secu-
rities within or from the state.218 The Martin Act does not define "fraudulent
practice," 'but employs instead such conclusionary terms as "deception, mis-
representation . .. false promise." Brushing aside the argument that the act
is "quasi-criminal" and must be construed narrowly, the New York courts
have given far-reaching scope to the "fraudulent practice" language, and have
justified their position upon the need to protect the inexperienced and credu-
lous investor.21 9 The attorney general's broad civil weapons are given addi-
tional leverage by his power to prosecute criminally fraudulent practices both
under the Martin Act and under assorted Penal Law 220 violations. The crim-
inal controls, however, have 'been used far less extensively than the civil.22'
an assortment of dishonest practices connected with securities activity. See Loss & Cowmrr
39-41, 250-52.
These statutes do not generally displace already existing common-law liabilities for de-
ception or fraud. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.40 (Page 1953) ; FLA. STAT. AnN.
§ 517.22 (1943) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 189.18(7) (1957).
215. Antifraud measures ordinarily operate independently of the registration system.
They apply equally to exempt and nonexempt securities or transactions, in much the same
way as § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933. See Loss & CowE'r 25.
216. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-59; N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 421, 660-62, 664, 926, 951-57.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-59, or '"Martin Act," is treated as New York's Blue Sky Law.
2 BLUE SxY L. REP. 111 311011.
217. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:1-1 to -29 (1955); see Cowett, Federal-State Relation-
ships in Securities Regulation, 28 GEo. WASH. L. RaV. 287, 290-91 (1959).
218. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-53.
219. People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926). See also
People v. Tellier, 7 Misc. 2d 43, 155 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1956) ; People v. Royal Sec.
Corp., 5 Misc. 2d 907, 165 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ; People v. Abbott, 4 Misc. 2d 565,
147 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1955); People v. Wachtell, 181 Misc. 1010, 47 N.Y.S.2d 945
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
220. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 421 ("untrue... or misleading advertisement") most concerns
real estate syndication.
Several Penal Law sections apply only to corporations. See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW §§
660, 661, 664. Others may not apply to partnership ventures, for they concern only dealings
with "stocks, bonds or evidences of debt." See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 926, 951-54.
221, Interview With Carl Madonik, Assistant Attorney General of New York, in New
York City, Nov. 1958.
The dearth of reported cases involving criminal proceedings for securities fraud tends
to confirm that the criminal weapon is infrequently used.
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The Martin Act has been enforced fairly vigorously against questionable
real estate ventures. Upon learning of the Nassau Management attack, the
New York attorney general swiftly exercised his statutory powers. 2- Further
subscriptions were enjoined and receivers were appointed to manage the Nas-
sau properties.2 23 The combined salvage efforts of the receivers, investor-com-
mittees, and the attorney general have reduced losses to less than one million
dollars22 4 But the attorney general often does not have information upon
which to act until someone complains, and therefore usually after a question-
able promotion has produced actual securities sales.22  This underscores the
essential deficiency of the Iartin Act and other antifraud statutes, for they
do not become operative, in many instances, until after the investor has parted
with his money. Recognizing this shortcoming,220 the New York attorney
general initiated hearings to consider more comprehensive regulation of the
real estate syndicate.2 2 7 Interested parties advanced a plethora of regulatory
schemes, including an elaborate mechanism for self-policing by the syndicate
222. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1958, p. 40, col. 4.
223. Id., Jan. 23, 1958, p. 1, col. 4 (Supreme Court directs four officers #f Nassau Man-
agement Company to appear for questioning) ; id., Jan. 28, 1958, p. Rt, col. 1 (receivers
appointed) ; id., Feb. 21, 1958, p. 15, col. 2 (Nassau Management Company enjoined per-
manently from dealings in real estate shares or other securities in New Yo-rk State) ; id.,
June 6, 1958, p. 1, col. 1 (Nassau Management Company and two officers indicted for grand
larceny).
224. Id., Dec. 17, 1959, p. 20, col. 5.
In addition to his role in the Nassau affair, the Attorney General has obtained injunc-
tions against a Brooklyn firm for selling 8% debentures while insolvent, see id., April 4,
1938, p. 29, col. 1, and against a Jamaica concern for defrauding investors in the sale uf
so-called guaranteed mortgages, see id., April 30, 1958, p. 35, col. 3. In other instances he
has acted informally to eliminate borderline practices. For exa mple, in July 1957 he
threatened formal Martin Act action against the promoters of five questionable syndica-
tions, unless they offered to pay back all moneys (more than $4 million) received from their
investors. Better Business Bureau of New York City, Inc., News Release, Sept. 3, 1957.
Although each promoter acceded to the "request," and made the offer, only a few investor
accepted. Interview With Carl Madonik, Assistant Attorney General of New York, in New
York City, Nov. 1958.
225. Interview With Carl fadonik, Assistant Attorney General of New York, in New
York City, -March 7, 1960.
226. Because federal disclosure has not been required, New York's attorney general
and others have voiced repeatedly their concern for this gap in the protection available for
syndicate investors. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 16, 1958, § 8, p. 1, col. 4; Better Business
Bureau of New York City, Inc., News Release, Sept. 3, 1957 (statement of Hugh Jackson,
Pres.).
227. New York Attorney General Lefkowitz held a one-day conference on September
13, 1957. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1957, p. 19, col. 1. He then appointed retired Surrogate
George Frankenthaler to conduct further hearings, id., Sept. 20, 1957, p. 18, col. 2, which
were held November 6, 18, 1957. More than twenty witnesses, including syndicators, attor-
neys, college professors, accountants, and brokers appeared voluntarily. See id., Nov. 7,
1957, p. 61, col. 4; id., Nov. 19, 1957, p. 57, col. 4; see N.Y. Hearings on Real Estale Syn-
dication Before Hon. George Frankentaler, Nov. 6, 18, 1957.
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promoters,228 the use of impartial panels of real estate experts to appraise all
syndicated properties,22 0 the creation of a centralized information bureau sim-
ilar to Dun & Bradstreet exclusively devoted to syndicate enterprise,230 and
the imposition upon every syndicate venture of a legally required contingency
228. Id., Nov. 18, 1957, at 2a.
Recognizing an increased community demand for their regulation, and concerned over
the bad publicity attending recent disclosures, thirty of the better known New York City
syndicators banded together and formed Realty Investment Syndicators Association, Inc.
(RISA) in October 1.957. Membership in RISA was voluntary, and available not only to
the promoters, but also to those in related pursuits-attorneys, accountants, real estate
brokers, mortgage bankers.
RISA's announced raison; d'itre was a Code of Ethics and Fair Business Practices, to
which all members would subscribe. Under RISA by-laws (§ 5), violation of the Code
could bring expulsion and public censure.
The Code requires a limited disclosure for all nonprivate offerings over $250,000. The
promoter must prepare a brochure for review by a RISA panel of at least three lawyers,
three accountants, and three "having knowledge and experience in the value and operation
of real estate." The panel might conduct hearings, ask for relevant documents, suggest
changes, and was to accept or reject the printed brochure based on Code standards. RISA
promoters agreed to circulate only accepted brochures.
The Code's disclosure standards (§ 2) are less rigorous than those the attorney general
later sought to enact into New York State law. See notes 233-36 infra and accompanying
text. The Code calls for a full description of the property, mortgages and other liens;
identification of the syndicate managers, their interest, compensation, and profit; and a state-
ment of estimated income and expenses. The Code does not provide for a statement of past
income and expenses; assurances of certified annual reports; and clearly defined distinctions
between distributions of capital and income.
Although RISA is still in -being, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1959, p. 66, col. 1, the brochure
procedure awaits its first use, Interview With J. M. Tenney, New York City, Nov. 27, 1959.
No RISA member seriously thinks this event will ever occur. Perhaps it is just as well.
The pressure for better investor protection remains where it belongs on the SEC and Blue
Sky officials.
229. N.Y. Hearings on Real Estate Syndication Before Hon. George Frankenthaler,
Nov. 6, 1957, pp. 47-55.
The suggestion came from Sanders A. Kahn, Supervisor of Real Estate Education, City
College of New York. Mr. Kahn suggested that the attorney general would set up a master
panel of approved appraisers. For each offering, panel members would decide whether the
promoter had placed a reasonable value on the syndicated property.
Surrogate Frankenthaler felt that this procedure placed the attorney general in the role
of giving or denying approval to proposed ventures, duties similar to the responsibility of
most -Blue Sky officials. See text at note 240 infra. Whatever he may have thought about
the benefits to the investor of an unbiased real estate appraisal, Frankenthaler did not want
the attorney general in the securities qualification business. Frankenthaler, Report to [N.Y.]
Attorney General Louis Lefkowitz, Feb. 17, 1958, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
In some Blue Sky states, the administrator may ask for an appraisal of the issuer's as-
sets. See note 257 infra.
230. N.Y. Attorney General, Conference on Real Estate Syndication, Sept. 13, 1957,
p. 61.
If requested, the Better Business Bureau of New York City, Inc., will write up and
furnish to inquirers any detrimental reports in its files on specified syndicate promoters.
The bureau also acts as an informal SEC, by taking complaints directly to the promoter.
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reserve.2 1 Dismissing most of these suggestions as "impractical," 2 - the at-
torney general instead drafted a legislative proposal based upon the time-tried
safeguard of full disclosure, similar to section 5 of the Securities Act, but with
its disclosure requirements tailored for the real estate symdicate. - m In 1958,
If the complaint seems well-founded, the bureau tries "moral suasion." If this appeal fails,
the bureau may then refer the complaint to the attorney general.
Interview With Robert P. Schron, Director of Public Information, Better Business
Bureau of New York City, Inc., in New York City, Oct. 24, 1958.
231. N.Y. Hearings on Real Fstate Syndication Before Hon. George Frankenthaler,
Nov. 6, 1957, pp. 58-70.
In urging that syndicates set up "contingency reserves," Meyer Horowitz, a New York
attorney, pointed -to a venture that needed unexpectedly 2010,000 to repair fire damage. The
mortgagee agreed to supply all but $50,000. The $50,000 could not be raised and the syn-
dicate folded. Horowitz suggested that the starting reserve be 10%-15% of the cash equity,
with annual 2% (of gross income) increments.
The mandatory "reserve"' concept has its counterpart in the regulations for FHA-in-
sured cooperatives, 24 C.F.R. §§ 241.30(c), (d) (1959) (fund for replacements and general
operating reserve shall be established and maintained), and the regulations for FHA-insured
rental projects, 24 C.F.R. § 232.19(f) (3) (1959) (fund for replacement shall be accumulated
and maintained).
Mindful that the investor will resist unexpected requests for additional funds after the
venture is launched, some promoters have raised, as part of the subscription price, moneys
to complete needed improvements. See, e.g., Brocol Realty Co., Brochure, April 1959, p. 6;
501 Fifth Realty Co., Brochure, Nov. 12, 1959, p. 7.
232. Interview With Carl Madonik, Assistant Attorney General of New York, in New
York City, Nov. 1958.
233. The disclosure features of the 1958 measure (N.Y.A.I. No. 4236, 1958 Sess.
(March 5, 1958)) were changed slightly in the 1959 bill (N.Y.A.I. No. 2851, 1959 Sess.
(Feb. 3, 1959)), note 235 infra. Under both proposals, syndicators who made public offers
or sales in or from New York State were to file an offering statement with the attorney
general at least ten days prior to a public offering. Under the 1959 measure, the offering
statement would have made the following disclosure:
(b) The detailed terms of the transaction;
A description of the property, the nature of the interest, and how title thereto is
to be held;
the gross and net income for a reasonable period immediately preceding the offering
where applicable and available;
,the current gross and net income where applicable and available;
the basis, rate and method of computing depredation;
a description of major current leases;
the essential terms of all mortgages;
the names, addresses and business background of the principals involved, the nature
of their fiduciary relationship and their financial relationship, past, present and future,
to the property offered to the syndicate and to those who are to participate in its
management;
the interests and profits of the promoters, officers, syndicate organizers, directors,
trustees or general partners, direct and indirect, in the promotion and management
of the venture;
all restrictions, if any, on transfer of participants' interests;
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1959,234 and again in 1960,235 the legislature acted on the attorney general's
a statement as to what stock or other security involved in the transaction, if any, is
non-voting;
a statement as to what disposition will be made of the funds received and of the
transaction if not consummated, which statement shall represent that all moneys re-
ceived from the sale of such securities until actually employed in connection with the
consummation of the transaction, shall be kept in escrow as a trust fund, and that
in the event insufficient funds are raised through the offering or otherwise to effec-
tuate the purchase or purchases or other consummation of the contemplated trans-
action, or that the intended acquisition shall not be completed for any other reason
or reasons, then such moneys shall be returned to the investor;
which of the securities offered are unsecured;
clearly distinguish between leasehold and fee ownership, between fact and opinion;
a commitment to submit annual reports to all participants, including an annual bal-
ance sheet and profit and loss statement certified by an independent certified public
accountant;
clearly distinguish between those portions of promised distributions which are income
and those which are a return of principal or capital;
and such additional information as the attorney general may prescribe in rules and
regulations . . . as will afford potential investors, purchasers and participants an
adequate basis upon which to found their judgment ...
234. N.Y. Times, March 26, 1958, p. 20, col. 4; 1959 N.Y. LEGis. SERV. 156 (N.Y.A.I.
No. 2851, 1959 Sess., introduced in Assembly by Assemblyman Russo and referred to Ways
and Means Committee) ; id. at 181 (companion bill N.Y.S.I. No. 2416, 1959 Sess., intro-
duced in Senate). N.Y.A.I. No. 2851, The Russo Bill, closely resembled the ill-fated measure
of 1958. It had these differences:
(1) The ten day prior-to-offering period for filing offering statements with the
Department of Law was dropped.
(2) The attorney general received discretion to exempt:
(a) An offering to forty persons or fewer;
(b) Securities fully registered with the SEC or exempt from SEC registra-
tion other than intrastate offerings to New York residents.
(3) All violations were deemed fraudulent practices, hence misdemeanors, (com-
pare N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352-c). In the 1958 bill, failure to treat subscrip-
tion moneys as a trust fund prior to their use in consummating the transaction
was treated as a felony.
(4) Appropriation to the Department of Law reduced to $50,000.
In addition to the Russo Bill, two other proposals were introduced; these died in Com-
mittee. See 1959 N.Y. LEGIs. SEav. 96 (N.Y.A.I. No. 1345, 1959 Sess.) (syndicator to file
semi-annual financial report with attorney general) ; id. at 156, 222 (N.Y.S.I. No. 3521,
1959 Sess.) (syndicator to file prescribed offering statement with Department of Law).
235. See Letter From Carl Madonik, Assistant Attorney General, New York State, to
Curtis J. Berger, April 7, 1960, on file in Yale Law Library. The 1960 measure was intro-
duced by Assemblyman Russo, N.Y.A.I. No. 2466, 1960 Sess., and Senator Anderson, N.Y.
S.I. No. 1856, 1960 Sess. Its disclosure features are virtually unchanged from those approved
by the Legislature in 1959. See note 233 supra.
If Governor Rockefeller signs the current bill, syndicate control in New York State will
move forward significantly. But the measure has at least one major deficiency. Although
syndicators of nonexempt offerings will be required to file a prospectus with the Department
of Law, the bill does not provide for systematic review, in the SEC fashion, to determine
whether the prospectus meets the disclosure standards.
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recommendations. In the first two instances the Governor vetoed the pro-
posals ;26 he has not yet acted on the 1960 measure.
Blue Sky security registration provisions are frequently more rigorous
than the Securities Act requirements. This departure is significant to the pro-
spective investor, for it reflects a fundamental difference in regulatory policy.
Whereas the federal objective is full disclosure, regardless of the potential in-
vestment risks, the prevailing Blue Sky goal is guarding the would-be in-
vestor from the temptation of a questionable offering.m- Accordingly, security
registration in most states is completed only if the issue "qualifies" for sale
within the jurisdiction.2 38 In the first instance, the issuer, underwriter, or
broker-dealer files a disclosurelike registration statement with the Blue Sky
administrator, who reviews the filed documents to assure himself that the dis-
closures are materially complete and devoid of statements likely to mislead.? °
As an additional responsibility, -however, the administrator is also directed to
judge whether the underlying transaction merits public participation. His
judgment that the offering "qualifies" is a prerequisite to lawful public solici-
tation. An adverse judgment places the nonqualifying jurisdiction "out-of-
bounds" to the proposed offering, unless the applicant can overturn the find-
ing upon appeal. 240
236. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1958, p. 27, col. 4 (1958 veto by Governor Harriman) ; 1959
N.Y. LEuis. SEam. [unpaginated bill history] (1959 veto by Governor Rockefeller).
In 1958, both the Realty Investment Syndicators Association and the Committee un
State Legislation, Bar of the City of New York, beseeched Governor Harriman to veto the
syndicate-control measure, although they stated quite different reasons. RISA objected
chiefly to the act's criminal provisions. See Letter From RISA to Governur Harriman,
April 7, 1958. The 1959 bill dropped the felony penalty, sLe note 323 supra, and RISA
dropped its opposition, Interview With Carl Madonik, Assistant Attorney General, New
York State, in New York City, March 7, 1960.
The bar association committee criticized the act's broad coverage which seemingly in-
cluded not only real estate syndicates, but also bank and investment trust securities. "Such
a fundamental change in New York's blue-sky law should not be effected without compre-
hensive consideration of the possible effects of the change upon security issued by others
than so-called real-estate syndicates." The Comm. on State Legislation, Ass'n of the Bar
of the City of N.Y. Resolution No. 165 (1958). In addition, the committee pointed uut the
inconsistencies with the Federal Securities Act (the exemptions in the 1959 bill would have
removed these), and urged even stronger regulatory controls, including attorney general
review of all filed offering statements, if the act confined these controls to real estate syn-
dicates.
237. See Cowett, Federal-State Relationshlip in, Securities Regulation, 28 GEo. WAs .
L. REv. 287, 292 & nn.31-32 (1959), citing Loss & Cow=r 30-42, 67-77, 282-331.
238. Loss & Cowrrr 30-36.
239. Representative procedures based on securities qualification would include KA.%
GEx. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1258 to -1260 (Supp. 1959); WVs. STAT. A.:. §§ 1S9.13-.16
(1957) ; CAT. CoEP. CoDE ANN. §§ 25500-15. See Loss & CowErr 39-42.
240. See, e.g., Fi. STAT. ANm. § 517.24 (1943) ; N.D. RExv. CoDE § 10-0415 (1943).
Ordinarily, the unsuccessful Blue Sky applicant will have little luck on review, since
the administrator's discretion is upheld absent a showing such as fraud, abuse of power, or
unreasonableness. See, e.g., Doble Steam Motors Corp. v. Daugherty, 195 Cal. 158, 166, 232
Pac. 140, 143 (1924) ; State ex rel. Hardstone Brick Co. v. Department of Commerce, 174
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Diverse standards guide the administrators in their qualitative determina-
tion. Most of these are couched in general phrases: "the sale ... would work
a fraud, deception, or imposition upon the purchasers" ;241 "the issuer's plan
of business is unsound" ;22 "the enterprise . . . is against public policy."' U
A number of statutes, or the regulations promulgated under them, are more
explicit in reference to promotional ventures. Factors which may result in
"nonqualification" include the issuance of promotional shares for less than fair
value ;244 the failure of the independently appraised promoter's equity to reach
a required percentage ;245 the use of a limited partnership ;240 the issuance by
new corporations of debt securities or preferred stock ;247 the issuance of pro-
moter shares which carry with them majority control 248 or exclusive voting
rights.249 Even if the administrator is disposed to qualify the offering, he may
exercise various other controls to safeguard the investor. Quite commonly,
Blue Sky officials are empowered to regulate the use and content of advertis-
ing media,250 set maximum limits on underwriting commissions, 281 impound
Minn. 200, 219 N.W. 81 (1928). In at least one jurisdiction, however, the administrator's
action may be challenged in a trial de novo. UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-41 (1953); Lauren
W. Gibbs, Inc. v. Monson, 102 Utah 234, 129 P.2d 887 (1942).
241. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 53, § 12(2) (a) (1941); accord, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121y,
§ 137.1.1 H (1957) ("fraud or deceit"); HAWAH Ray. LAWS § 199-10 (1955) ("fraudu-
lent") ; Loss & Cowm-r 325, 328-29.
242. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.09(7) (1943) ("business ... based upon unsound
business principles") ; Ixn. STAT. ANN. § 25-836 (1948) (same) ; ALA. CODE ANN. tit.
53, § 12(2) (d) (1941) ("plan ... unfair, inequitable").
243. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 53, § 12(2) (g) (1941) ; accord, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 189.16(7)
(1957) ("any [other] reason . . . appropriate in the public interest); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 78-11(2) (g) (1950).
244. See, e.g., 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 38720 (Ohio Ruling 20: Sales of similar secu-
rities at varying prices "grossly unfair") ; ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 53, § 12(2) (f) (1941) ;
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1260(a) (3) (Supp. 1959) (promotional shares exceed "rea-
sonable value" of property exchanged).
245. See, e.g., 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. f1 46602 (Tex.: 10% promoter's cash equity required
if developmental venture) ; 1 id. f 16627 (I11.: if fair value of promoter's equity less than
15%, offering presumed "inequitable").
246. See, e.g., 1 id. ff 8632 (Cal.: ordinarily, a limited partnership will be considered
with disfavor as the basis for a promotional enterprise).
247. See, e.g., 1 id. ff 13641. (Fla.).
248. See, e.g., 2 id. f1 34601 (N.M.: promotional stock not to exceed 50% of offering);
I id. 1[ 5612 (Ala.: "equitable participation" between shares sold for cash and promotional
shares) ; 1 id. I[ 8618 (Cal.: promotional securities shall in no event have over 50% par-
ticipation rights).
249. See, e.g., 2 id. 1 38719 (Ohio Ruling 19: issuance to public investors of non-voting
shares without specified dividend rights "grossly unfair") ; 1 id. 11 15609 (Idaho: no favor-
able consideration where promotional security has greater rank than security sought to be
qualified).
250. Loss & CowEir 381.
A number of qualification states bar the use of advertising matter that has not been sub-
mitted to and approved by the Blue Sky commissioner. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80.18
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sale proceeds pending the marketing of the security,25 2 place promotional
shares in escrow,a2 " prohibit distributions on promotional shares until a stated
return has been paid to the public investors, 2 require the filing of a fidelity
bond,255 obtain service of process designation from nonresident principals, 25 G
(Supp. 1959); kVis. STAT. ANN. §§ 189.01-.30 (1957). Thus, if the issuer does use sales
literature, the investor may benefit from disclosure as well as qualification. On the other
hand, if the issuer does not use advertising matter, the investor will only be protected by
qualification. In these states, as well as in states where the Blue Sky commissioner does
not review promotional media, the essential difference between the disclosure aims of the
Federal Securities Act and the qualification philosophy of the Blue Sky Laws is emphasized.
Even though the security has qualified, the investor may not have the disclosure necessary
to making a considered investment choice.
Only a few Blue Sky jurisdictions impose upon the issuer a positive duty to supply each
offeree with a copy of an approved prospectus. See, e.g., Loss & Cowrr 305-06.
251. See, e.g., 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. ff 52610 (Wis. 15%); 2 id. f[ 34606 (N.M. 20%);
2 id. ff 37607 (N.D. 15%) ; 1 id. ff 5615 (Ala. 15%) ; 1 id. l 8615 (Cal. 0%-220%). See
also Loss & Cow=r 329.
252. See, e.g., CA.. CoRu. CODE ANN. § 25508; CAL ADMIIN. CODE tit. 10, §§ 393-402;
IL. Ray. STAT. ch. 121Y, § 137.11(d) (1957). See also Loss & Cowrr 312.
253. See Loss & CowErr 311-12; e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 292.200 (1953) (escrow until
other investors have been paid for two years, dividends aggregating not less than 6%
"actually earned on the investment") ; KAN. Gm. STAT. ANN. § 17-1259(d) (Supp. 1959)
("escrow ... [pending] dividends aggregating not less than six per cent . . . actually
earned"); Ga. Laws 1959, No. 86, § 11 (in 1 BLUE Sxy L. REP. 1 14103-1) (escrow at
Comm'r's discretion for period not exceeding two years) ; CAL- ADMIN. CoDE tit. 10, § 407-
21.
Shares subject to escrow are variously defined as: "securities issued for services ren-
dered.. . for a monetary consideration 'substantially lower' [than sales price to public] ,"
CA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 368; "securities issued in payment of property,. . . promotion,"
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1259(d) (Supp. 1959) ; "securities issued for... promotion
fees or expenses," Ky. REv. STAT. § 292.200 (1953).
Query: What happens when more than one Blue Sky commissioner seeks to escrow the
same promotional shares, and in different depositories? Cf. UxiFoa SECUmTIEs Ac-r §
305(g). Aside from the infrequency of their use, Loss & Cowa-rr 312, escrows, as now per-
mitted, would not be helpful where the syndicate promoter does not receive units in the
venture, but does receive directly part of the sales proceeds for a contract assignment, or
where, as in Motors Building Realty Company, note 190 supra, the issuer did not sell out
the entire offering in the original promotion and ended up owning over $400,000 in par-
ticipation units. See Motors Building Realty Corp., Prospectus, Oct. 21, 1959, p. 5 (second-
ary offering).
254. See, e.g., CAL. CoRp. CODE ANN. § 25508 (promotional shares to waive some divi-
dend rights while held in escrow).
255. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 53, § 12(3) (1941) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 5365
(1957) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-109 (1959).
256. See Loss & Cowar' 220-22, 406; e.g., CAL- CORP. CODE ANN. § 25505(b); KANY.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1263 (Supp. 1959) ; Wxs. STAT. ANN. § 189.13 (1957).
Some statutes, including New York's, go a step further and permit substituted service
against a nonresident issuer who is doing business within the state even though he has not
registered. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352-a; Uxioa SEcuamEs Acr § 414(h); Loss &
Cowmrv 407-09.
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order an independent appraisal of all assets, 2 57 and require the submission of
periodic financial statements.25 8
In every Blue Sky state, some groups of securities escape registration
through exemptions roughly paralleling those embodied 'by the Securities Act.
Exempt transactions abound as well. Among these, most states have some
counterpart to the section 4(1) private offering, 'but they customarily reduce
the confusion of the Securities Act by specifically injecting quantitative con-
tent into the exemption.
25 9
Even when registration becomes necessary, not every offering must "qual-
ify." Registration by notification or description, which contemplates the filing
of a simple informational return, is widely available for securities issued by a
"going concern,' 260 or debentures secured by real estate first mortgages. 20 1
Registration by coordination, designed especially for issues simultaneously
undergoing Securities Act registration, is a feature of several statutes.202 'Co-
257. See, e.g., 1 BLUE Sxy L. REP. f 5628 (Ala.: independent appraisals to deter-
mine value where Commissioner deems it advisable) ; 1 id. 1 15633 (11.: mandatory ap-
praisal of issuer's assets if issuer engaged in business less than five years) ; 1 id. I[ 8622
(Cal.: licensee shall furnish an appraisal when requested).
258. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 25515 (financial reports to be submitted as
required by commissioner) ; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1213/2, § 137.11 (c) (1957) (financial state-
ments as often as circumstances may warrant).
259. For state counterparts of § 4(1), see, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 189.07 (1957) (1S
security holders) ; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 21.20.320(9) (1959) (not more than 20 offerees
within state). See also Loss & Cow'rr 368-74; UNIFORM SwuiuTiEs LAW § 402(b) (g)
(not more than 10 offerees within state).
260. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.08(1) (1943) (issuer in continuous operation
not less than three years, with specified minimum earnings record); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-1256(a) (1) (Supp. 1959) (issuer "in continuous operations not less than five
years,") ; OHIO Rsv. CODE ANN. § 1707.05(A) (Page 1953) (issuer or guarantor in con-
tinuous operations not less than three years) ; UNIFORM SECURITIES Acr § 302(a) (1). For
a discussion of the notification procedures, see Loss & CoWETT 284-89.
261. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.05(B) (Page 1953) (first mortgage not
exceeding two-thirds "fair market value" of mortgaged property located in United States
or Canada); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-12 5 6(a) (2)-(3) (Supp. 1959) (first mortgage
on agricultural lands not exceeding 60% of then "fair market value" of lands plus 40A
of insured value of improvements; first mortgage on improved city, town, or village real
estate not exceeding 60% of then fair market value) ; MiiN. STAT. ANN. § 80.09(2) (1946)
(first mortgage on agricultural lands not exceeding 70% of then fair market value of lands,
including improvements; first mortgage on city or village real estate not exceeding 70%
of then fair market value including improvements; if net rental lease, net annual income,
after deducting operating expenses and income at least equal to annual interest plus not
less than 3% of mortgage principal).
262. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-509 (1956); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
581-7C (Supp. 1959) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1257 (Supp. 1959). These provisions
are modeled on UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 303. Its authors consider registration by co-
ordination the Act's most popular feature. Loss & CowEn 291.
Some Blue Sky administrators are willing, in the absence of express authority, to ad-




ordination simplifies the paper work of a federal-state registration by enabling
the issuer to submit documents already filed with the SEC. The Blue Sky ad-
ministrator, however, retains the privilege to test the securities against the
state's qualification standards.203 Registration by coordination is seldom avail-
able for small issues filing under Regulation A.204
Even if the proposed offering is nonexempt and ineligible for a simplified
registration, qualification and the accompanying controls may not result in a
high level of investor protection. In many jurisdictions, Blue Sky laws are
enforced by part-time officials,2 5 for whom security regulation is one of many
diverse responsibilities. Blue Sky administrators are typically overworked, ill-
paid, understaffed, inexperienced, and prone to political and local pressures. -2 0 0
Due to such deficiencies of administration, the parties to a security offering
may deliberately choose noncompliance or, quite commonly with local trans-
actions, fail to recognize the Blue Sky implications.
To date, Blue Sky administrators have been asked only occasionally to
stamp their approval upon syndicate offerings.20 7 With the prospective in-
creased use of syndication, the contact between issuer and administrator may
be reasonably expected to increase. The present application of many qualifi-
cation statutes might disqualify, perhaps automatically, the bulk of syndicate
ventures, and should invoke, almost certainly, the use of various auxiliary con-
trols upon those offerings which qualify.
The syndicate's vulnerability in the face of qualification requirements stems
chiefly from two of its recurring traits-the small quantum of investor con-
trol, and the large quantum of promoter reward, in the form of immediate
profit or a participation interest. Several states regard as "inequitable" ex-
clusive voting control in the promoter..20 s Even corporate or partnership pro-
263. Under registration by coordination, the issuer files, as the major part of his regis-
tration statement, three copies of the SEC prospectus, and an undertaking to furwvard all
amendments to the federal registration statement The Blue Sky registration statement
becomes effective simultaneously with the SEC registration, if: the statement has been on
file with the administrator for at least ten days, a statement of maximum and minimum
proposed offering prices and maximum proposed underwriting discounts and commissions
has been on file for at least two days (the administrator may shorten this period), and the
administrator has not issued a stop order. The administrator may stop the offering if the
security does not qualify. UIFoRm SEcumRTrEs Acr §§ 303(b) (c).
264. See statutes cited note 262 supra. But see NV.%su. REv. CODE A.,.;. § 21.20.180
(1959).
265. In 1958, the responsible officials in only 23 jurisdictions devoted full time to Blue
Sky Law administration. In 15 states, securities regulation was less than a half-day affair.
Loss & Cowzrr 47-52.
266. See id. at 55-64.
267. Interview With Edward M. Cowett, New York Attorney, in New York City,
Feb. 12, 1960; Letter From Charles F. Carpentier, Secretary of State of Ill., to Curtis J.
Berger, Nov. 15, 1958, on file in Yale Lav Library ("10 applications to register real
estate syndicates and cooperative housing offerings in Illinois during the past five years") ;
Letter From Edward J. Samp, Director, ,Vis. Dep't of Securities, to Curtis J. Berger, Oct.
29, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library (only one "for some time").
268. See note 249 supra.
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visions which grant the public investor a modicum of voting privilege-e.g.,
the right -to approve a sale or mortgage of syndicate property, the assertion
of control following dividend defaults-are certain to ,be carefully scrutinized.
Blue Sky censure based upon the inadequacy of the promoter's equity, or
the disproportionate value of promotional shares, seems more reasonably re-
lated to investor protection. A promoter whose reward is assured upon the
successful marketing of the syndicate units, especially if he has little of his
own capital tied up in the venture, may have little incentive to maximize the
profits of the public participants. The use of an undeviating percentage stand-
ard, -however, for testing whether the promoter's profit is ".fair" seems overly
rigorous if uniformly applied to all ventures, for each syndication is sufficiently
distinctive to warrant a flexible, individualized analysis. Factors for an ad-
ministrator's consideration in weighing the fairness of the promotional inter-
ests include the size and forfeiture risk of the promoter's deposit; whether the
venture is developmental-i.e., rehabilitation or new construction-thereby
demanding of the promoter greater resourcefulness and energy; whether the
promotional profits are realized from the offering proceeds rather than post-
poned or subordinated pending a minimum return to the public investor; the
extent to which the 'benefits of an improved operation or a resale profit are
earmarked for the promoter and investor.
The apprehension with which syndicators might view the qualification proc-
ess is exemplified by the syndication of the General Motors Building lease-
hold.2 69 Seeking to raise over five million dollars in the spring of 1958, the
promoter embarked upon an interstate solicitation, and accordingly registered
his offering pursuant to Securities Act section 5. But when -he sought Blue
Sky approval, the administrators in California, Illinois, Michigan, and Wis-
consin denied the applications.270 The explanations for the Illinois and Wis-
consin rejections are instructive. Illinois based its action on the size of the
promoters' equity investment (less than fifteen per cent), the assurance of an
immediate 450,000-dollar profit to the general partners, and the promoters' use
of a wholly-owned management company and operating lessee to furnish ad-
ditional profits from the venture.27 1 Wisconsin looked to the small size of
the promoters' investment, the lack of voting rights in the investors, the pro-
moters' failure to disclose the sublessee's financial status, and the use of a pic-
torial prospectus. 272 Thus both emphasized the seeming unfairness of the pro-
269. See Motors Building Realty Co., Prospectus, June 3, 1958.
270. Letter From Louis A. Siegel, Senior Vice President, Glickman Corp., to Curtis
J. Berger, Feb. 24, 1960, on file in the Yale Law Library. The securities were able to be
sold in 32 states and the District of Columbia. Ibid.
271. Securities Div., Secretary of State, Ill., Special Bull. No. 114, Notice of With-
drawal of Application, Nov. 14, 1958.
272. Letter From Edward J. Samp, Director, Wis. Dep't of Securities, to Curtis J.
Berger, Nov. 7, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library.
Administrators have been debating the "integrity" of prospectuses including pictures
and art work, and at least two states, Florida and Texas, have banned them. The SEC has
permitted the use of pictorial prospectuses, probably on the theory that photographs will
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moters' potential rewards in contrast with his minimal risk. Neither expressed
concern, perhaps because they were unauthorized to do so, with certain sub-
stantive features of the scheme-the shortness of the primary lease term, 3 de-
pendence upon a single sublessee with cancelable leases covering nearly eighty
per cent of the building,274 the possibility of substantial capital e-penditures
in the near future 2 75 -which seem quite detrimental to the syndicate partici-
pant. Their approach suggests, therefore, that security qualification, even when
conscientiously administered, is no substitute for investor analysis. At best,
qualification is a relatively unrefined screening process designed to reduce the
number of investment choices permitted by a pure disclosure statute.
Most states provide for registration of persons engaged in security dealings
with the public.2 76 Broker-dealers, their agents, and, in some states, issuers .- 7
are generally expected to register with the Blue Sky commissionerY 8
In many states, broker-dealer registration resembles security qualification,
in that the administrator has power to grant, deny, revoke, or suspend
licenses.279 Often his judgment is directed by the statute to such criteria as
financial responsibility, good repute, or the fairness of the proposed business
plan.28 0 When the registrant furnishes details of the securities he intends to
handle, the administrator's regard for the securities becomes a compelling
render the prospectus more attractive and enhance the likelihood that investors will read
the entire brochure. See Cowett, Fcdcral-Stale Relaionships in Securities Rcgulation, 28
GEo. WAsR. L. Rav. 287, 298 (1959).
273. The ground lease acquired by the syndicate expires on July 31, 1979, but it con-
tains an option to renew for an additional term ending December 31, 2007. See Motors
Building Realty Co., Prospectus, June 3, 1958, p. 12. By 1979, however, the General 'Motors
Building will be 52 years old, well past middle age for a major midtown 'Manhattan struc-
ture. Id. at 5-6. Should the syndicate still own the leasehold in 1979 and want to replace
the building, the shortness of the renewal term followed by reversion to the fee owner in
2007 would prove a formidable barrier to such action.
274. The tenant, General Motors Corporation, has a cancellation privilege for 219 , of
its space as of April 1963. The remaining 71% leased by General Motors may be vacated
in 1968. Id. at 5. Should the cancellation privilege be exercised to its maximum permissible
in 1963, the annual rent paid by General Motors will drop from $1,700,000 to $1,150,000.
275. Substantial costs may be incurred to remodel for new tenants in 1963 or 1968
should General Motors vacate its present space. Id. at 7.
276. Forty-six states license or register securities brokers or dealers. See Loss &
Cow=r 26. For a compilation of respective state statutes, see id. at 39-4.
277. See, e.g., N.Y. Gm. Bus. LAw § 359-e; TFx. REv. Civ. STAT. . art. 581-4C
(Supp. 1959).
More than twenty statutes require the issuer to register if it is planning to market any
securities to the public without the intervention of licensed broker-dealers. Loss & Cowarr
336. For nondealer treatment, see Micn. STAT. AxN. § 19.761 (1959).
278. For exemptions, which are generally narrower than those available where regis-
tration of securities is required, see Loss & Cowr 333.
279. Id. at 271-77.
280. Ibid. For representative statutes, see CAL. Coax. CoDE ANN. § 25706; CoNx. GL-.
STAT. § 36-280 (1958) (registration denied if conviction within 5 years of crininal offense
involving securities) ; ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 1212, § 137.8 (1957).
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factor, thus, in a few states, security analysis takes place as part of the broker-
dealer registration.28 ' Bonding,28 2 reporting,283 and bookkeeping 284 require-
ments often condition the granting of the licenses.
New York has one of the simplest and, from the investor's view, least satis-
factory procedures.28 The registrant files a name and address notice with the
Department of State, and a statement of 'his criminal record, educational back-
ground, and prior business history with the Department of Law; in addition,
whenever the registrant wishes to deal in a specific nonexempt security, he
must file a further notice listing the name of the security, its issuer, address,
and place of organization. Presumably, the notice filed with the Department
of Law is intended to alert the attorney general to a condition, such as a prior
felony conviction for securities fraud, which would warrant the exercise of his
injunction-seeking powers.28 6 Otherwise, the attorney general has no inde-
pendent power to appraise and impose limits on the intending dealer. \Vhen
the notices are filed, registration is completed.
Broker-dealer registration adds little to the Blue Sky protection given the
real estate syndicate investor. Except for removing the least wholesome per-
sons from the syndicate 'business (provided they bother to register), and giv-
ing the BlueSky administrator, in the qualification states, a second, and un-
necessary, crack at the syndicate venture, broker-dealer registration is useful
only if and when it encourages security analysis by the administrator in states
with no other qualification procedure. The registration of broker-dealers in
New York may have, instead, an unintended perverse effect, if the investor
should rely upon the fact of registration, despite its rudimentary scope, to
enhance his regard for the syndicator and the proposed venture.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOmmENDATIONS
That syndication has made available hitherto untapped investment funds for
the financing of real estate transactions is neither an unmixed 'blessing nor an
undeserving phenomenon. Syndication's potential benefits are impressive: as
an alternative, and sometimes attractive, outlet for investors seeking higher
yield risks; as a technique for broadening the ownership base of realty; as an
additional source of developmental real estate capital, particularly in a con-
281. For example, securities are not registered in Pennsylvania, but broker-dealers
are. And at any time the administrator may require a dealer to list the securities that he is
selling. If the administrator finds that any of such offerings "either (1) have not been made
honestly, or (2) have not been made in good faith, (3) have been made with intent to de-
ceive or defraud, or (4) have been made without the dealer's having a reasonable amount
of information concerning the issuer thereof . . . ," -he may prohibit their sale. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 70, § 44 (Supp. 1958). See also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421:29 (1955) ; ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, § 229 (1954).
282. See Loss & CowETT 142-46.
283. Id. at 268-69.
284. Id. at 268.
285. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359(e) (2) (f).
286. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 353.
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tinuing "'fight-money" era; as a means of facilitating the marketing of real
estate properties, which, by increasing liquidity, may have the bootstrap effect
of increasing the attractiveness of realty investment. Partially offsetting these
benefits, however, are the potentially destructive consequences which may flow
from the deleterious features of certain syndications. To protect public inves-
tors from their own lack of knowledge or from unscrupulous syndicate pro-
moters, some independent control is needed. The basis for this control is al-
ready available, and is contained in the federal Securities Act of 1933 and the
state Blue Sky Laws. Because a syndicate participation interest is clearly a
"security" within the broad sweep of these laws, governmental power to regu-
late their public offering and sale, as well as the venture's postorganizational
activity, has not been successfully challenged. Despite the presence of the
power, however, neither federal nor state authority is having a sizeable regu-
latory impact upon current syndicate activity, since perhaps ninety per cent of
syndicate ventures evade the network of disclosure contemplated by the Secu-
rities Act, or the more discriminating qualification procedures of most Blue
Sky Laws. Although one hundred per cent registration of syndication enter-
prise may not be a practicable ambition, its present boundaries need and can
be greatly extended.
The 3(a) (11) intrastate exemption, as a means of Securities Act avoidance,
has been repeatedly misused. Although the evidence of this abuse is frequently
public record, the SEC has been lackadaisical in curbing such practice, despite
oft-stated threats. By a well-publicized exercise of its strong arm, directed at
a few patent violations, the SEC might achieve a far-reaching effect on pro-
moters who lean too heavily on section 3(a) (11). Even if the SEC were to
take section 3(a) (11) seriously, however, enforcement might result in an in-
crease in the number of syndicate ventures whose investors were not entitled
to SEC disclosures, since promoters might become more selective in their
choice of property and offerees. Thus, the intrastate exemption is a big gap
in federal syndicate control.
The extreme approach at reform would be repeal of section 3 (a) (11). Con-
stitutional barriers to the regulation of wholly intrastate offerings might be
surmounted if power were based on regulation of the mails, forbidding use
thereof to offers which do not meet prescribed standards. (Presumably, if the
mails were not used, an intrastate venture would, even after repeal, escape
federal surveillance.) But the political and practical effects of eliminating com-
pletely the intrastate exemption may be considerable, particularly during an
Administration reluctant to expand federal activity if the states can do the
job. And substantially increasing the burden upon the SEC's already strained
facilities is not administratively feasible if satisfactory control is available at
the state level. Instead of outright repeal, Congress should establish standards
and then enlarge the SEC's rulematidng power to permit the agency to con-
dition the availability of section 3(a) (11). In this way, the Commission can
apply a turncock on the flow of regulated intrastate transactions, depending
upon the adequacy of alternative control under local Blue Sky Laws. Thus,
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the SEC might decide to render unavailable the intrastate exemption in New
York and New Jersey, where there is presently no state-controlled disclosure.
But in those states where the investor received satisfactory disclosure, addi-
tional Federal control would be superfluous, and the issuer in a localized trans-
action might by SEC ruling be permitted to dispense with a Securities Act
registration.
The private offering exemption has also created a substantial statutory gap
through which real estate syndicates have sought to avoid federal registration.
Unlike section 3(a) (11) that seems to have acquired a unique relevance for
the real estate syndicate, section 4(1) is utilized by a variety of other major
securities transactions. Thus, any proposal directed to the repeal or extensive
revision of the private offering exemption seems inappropriate in an Article
on real estate syndication.
The Ralston Purina case makes it clear that syndicate promoters who rely
on section 4(1) will have the laboring oar if either the SEC or a disenchanted
investor challenges the failure to register. And this is as it should be. But the
promoter should not be left to guess whether, in an after-the-fact determina-
tion, his offering will be deemed private. Instead, the Securities Act might
provide the mechanism for the promoter to obtain a prior opinion as to tile
availability of the section 4(1) exemption. In seeking an opinion, the issuer
would state his plans for marketing the security, including the identity, num-
ber, and business background of the proposed offerees, their relationship to
the promoter, and some details of the securities; given these facts, the SEC
would decide whether the exemption fitted the intended transaction. The Com-
mission's opinion that an exemption was available would be subject, of course,
to the promoter carrying out his offering as contemplated.
Expanded federal control over the real estate syndicate is only a half-step
forward, unless it is coupled with improvements in registration procedure-
to facilitate promoter compliance and to make the final prospectus a more
meaningful document in the hands of the syndicate investor. The most urgent
need is for a registration form tailored to the real estate syndicate.
If it were to prepare a special registration form, the SEC might usefully
examine for its model the New York legislative proposals. The syndicate
promoter should be required to stress, and the investor should have before him
in an uncomplicated presentation, factors relevant to real property ownership
and syndicate involvement. For an existing structure, these would include:
physical condition of the real estate, including a description of elevators, air
conditioners, heating and electrical systems, and other major building com-
ponents; competitive factors, including location, existing tenants and rental
arrangements, vacancy rates, new construction; financing; past, current, as
well as projected operating statements; the identity of the operator of the
property, and the terms, including security for the performance, of the operat-
ing agreement; the extent of investor control over the venture; what arrange-
ments, if any, are present for the marketability of a syndication unit; a 'break-
down of the syndicate distribution into income and return of capital; an anal-
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ysis of the assumption under which the projected tax treatment depends; and
the sources and amounts of promoter reward.
Disclosure to the investor should not end after the venture takes being. In-
vestment is a continuing choice-process depending on up-to-date information.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 recognizes this by requiring larger con-
cerns to furnish annual reports to their investors. Yet once he has made his
investment, the average member of a real estate syndicate receives only the
barest information about the continuing operating performance of the property
in which he has an interest. This sparseness of detail reflects the usual relation
of the syndicate to the property-that of a landlord under a long-term net
lease. As the net landlord, the syndicate may not be entitled to the operating
particulars. Hence, the syndicate only furnishes to its members a report of
net rental received, with appropriate deductions for depreciation and perhaps
debt service.
But, as has been demonstrated, the operating tenant is often the syndicate
promoter or his affiliate. In these instances, although the promoter, as a mem-
ber of the syndicate, may not receive operating reports, the promoter, as the
operating tenant, has first-hand knowledge of the property's affairs. The pro-
moter knows, for example, by what margin the property has earned its net
rental, whether or not the margin is improving, and even whether a margin
exists (for the syndicator may have "fed the kitty" from his own pocket or
by commingling the revenues from other properties also under his control).
If this knowledge is available to -the promoter as the operating tenant, then
it surely belongs to the syndicate member or to anyone considering an invest-
ment in the syndicate.
Although the adoption of these reforms can raise the level of disclosure and
improve its tone, it hardly follows that syndication will become a risk-free
mode of investment. But for the amateur investor, who is attracted to syn-
dication, federal and state regulated disclosure may help him better to under-
stand and to evaluate his risks.
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